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Chapter 2
Complex Causality and Simplified
Representation
In this chapter I establish the most basic consequence of science performed by humans in a complex
world, namely, widespread idealization. As a first step, I make the case that a significant feature
of science is the search for causal regularities. By and large, this search results in the discovery of
partial causal regularities, viz., regularities that hold over a limited range of circumstances and that
have exceptions, even within the range over which they generally hold. I argue that there is no need
to posit a straightforward link between these partial causal regularities and metaphysically basic
causal processes. This discussion grounds a more specific characterization of the relevant sense in
which the world is complex, which I term causal complexity. I argue that causal complexity is a
pervasive feature of the world, and that it significantly impacts scientific practice. In the second half
of this chapter, my attention turns from the significance of causal analysis and causal complexity to
a widespread strategy of performing causal analysis in the face of all this complexity. I first discuss
model-based science, a common scientific practice that has lately received increasing philosophical
attention and that naturally leads to an emphasis on idealization. Then I further explore the role
played by idealization in science. I argue that this role is much more expansive than has been
appreciated. Idealizations are widespread even outside of model-based science, and the practice of
idealization does not fit within expected bounds. Idealizations are rampant in science, and they
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are unchecked.
2.1 The Significance of Causal Analysis
2.1.1 Partial Regularities, Causal Analysis, and Causes
In Chapter One I discussed the shift away from accounting for an eventual, perfected science or a
prettified, more rational version of science toward instead accounting for today’s actual scientific
practice, messiness and all. This shift has been accompanied by a great deal of attention to ways
in which science falls short of discovering laws, understood as exceptionless regularities that are
universal in scope. One influential early example is Cartwright (1983), who argues that physics’
most fundamental laws are in fact false. In Cartwright’s view, those laws are successful, for they are
explanatorily powerful, but they do not accurately describe nearly any actual systems. Cartwright
appeals to the example of Newton’s law of universal gravitation; as she points out, the physicist
Richard Feynman called this law “the greatest generalization achieved by the human mind” (1967,
p.14). Yet this law ignores the influence of charge on the two bodies in question, and so the
stated relationship is false of any systems with charged bodies. Additionally, the law assumes that
the mass of bodies is concentrated in a single point, that is, it applies to “point masses.” This
assumption leads to an accurate reflection of the behavior of spatially extended masses, but only if
the bodies are spherically symmetrical. It is not that Newton’s law of universal gravitation—and
our other best law-like generalizations—sometimes have exceptions, but that they do not hold true
for nearly any real systems. Like Cartwright, Giere (1999) argues that so-called laws are not true.
However, rather than maintain with Cartwright that the role of these laws must be reinterpreted,
Giere instead concludes that there simply are no laws of nature.
As a way of accommodating these types of observations, some philosophers investigate the role
of ceteris paribus clauses in scientific laws. “Ceteris paribus” literally means “all other things
being equal.” Ceteris paribus laws have been embraced especially in the “special sciences” or
“inexact sciences,” viz., those fields of science other than fundamental physics, where the absence
of universal laws is well appreciated. Debates surrounding ceteris paribus laws include whether
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the ceteris paribus clause renders a law empty, and if not, how the clause is to be interpreted, as
well as whether ceteris paribus laws are proper laws. Earman et al. (2003) provides a fairly recent
collection of essays on these and other issues surrounding ceteris paribus laws.
I do not take a stand on whether generalizations uncovered in science should be called laws,
nor on the status of ceteris paribus clauses. Regardless of the answers to these questions,
considerations like those Cartwright and Giere introduce have resulted in laws becoming less central
to philosophical investigations of science. In the past several decades, philosophical attention has
shifted significantly from the search for scientific laws and their subsequent application toward other
activities of science, including modeling, causal analyses, and mechanism sketches. The covering-
law approach to explanation due to Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) has been replaced by a range
of other approaches to explanation; especially prominent among them is the causal approach; two
prominent examples are (Salmon, 1984) and (Woodward, 2003). Machamer et al. (2000), in a
seminal paper in the mechanisms literature, note that laws of nature have little if any relevance to
their fields of focus, which are neurobiology and molecular biology, and they suggest that instead
“much of the practice of science can be understood in terms of the discovery and description of
mechanisms” (p.2). All of this suggests that, if bonafide, exceptionless laws of nature play any role
in science, it is a very small role at best. Instead, there is an acknowledged diversity of scientific
projects.
However, in my view, it is still possible to provide a general characterization that applies to
many of these diverse scientific projects. Instead of laws, science—by and large—is in the business
of uncovering partial regularities. Consider Giere’s (1999) suggestion that what are traditionally
understood as universal laws are instead “restricted generalizations”. Giere points out that to
productively employ Newton’s law of universal gravitation, one must explicitly restrict it to certain
kinds of systems, and even then, one must often employ approximation techniques before the law
applies even to those systems. This indicates two ways in which the regularities established in
science are partial. First, they have a restricted domain of application. Most regularities only hold
over some limited range of circumstances. Consider as a second example the ideal gas law. This
law only applies to a limited set of systems; it is inapplicable at very low temperatures and at very
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high pressures. Appending a ceteris paribus clause is one way to acknowledge such a restricted
domain of application, including when the domain of application is unclear. Second, regularities
have limited accuracy even within their domain of application. The ideal gas law exemplifies this
as well, for the law ignores both molecular size and intermolecular attraction, so each of these
factors diminishes the law’s accuracy. When necessary, correction terms can be introduced, which
yields the van der Waals equation. Yet the original form of the ideal gas law is often judged to be
sufficient.
What holds for Newton’s universal gravitation and the ideal gas law pertains to the regularities
identified in other fields of science as well. Almost all regularities are restricted in their domain, and
almost all regularities are approximate even within their domain of application. Partial regularities
are a natural replacement for universal laws of nature when one takes seriously that our science is
the product of limited human faculties and concerns, grappling with a world as complex as ours.
Powerful generalizations such as Newton’s law of gravitation that Feynman praised would be lost if
universal application or complete accuracy were the aim. The simplicity and straightforwardness of
a regularity at once increase its usefulness for limited humans and decrease its accuracy of a world
that is neither simple nor straightforward. The business of uncovering partial regularities can
proceed in a number of different ways. This construal thus applies to scientific generalizations that
employ ceteris paribus clauses; to apparent laws that are better understood as Giere’s restricted
generalizations; to the articulation of mechanisms that generally work a certain way; etc. It extends
to fundamental physics as well as to the special sciences. Physics is the product of limited human
beings as much as any other field of science, and physical phenomena outside of the laboratory are
just as complex (see Cartwright, 1983; Giere, 1999; Kennedy, 2012). The result is also the same:
generalizations that capture partial regularities.
* * *
There is more to be said about the nature of the partial regularities uncovered in science.
Characterized very abstractly, much of scientific exploration regards dependence relations, that is,
whether and how one entity or property depends upon another. Partial regularities are regularities
regarding dependence of one kind or another. The exploration of dependence relations takes many
26
different forms, but quite often the primary relation of dependence is thought of as causal influence.
Alongside her arguments against the truth of laws of physics, Cartwright (1983) defends the reality
of causes. Indeed, Cartwright (1989) argues that the discovery of “causal capacities” is a basic aim
of science. The prominence of causal accounts of scientific explanation underscores the significance
of causal dependence to science. In particular, Woodward’s (2003) influential analysis of causal
relations and explanation further accords with this emphasis. Even philosophers who focus on the
role of mechanisms in some fields of science, and thus who emphasize the centrality of organizational
dependence, also hold causal dependence to be absolutely central. I thus propose that science is
by and large in the business of uncovering partial causal regularities.
Both Cartwright (1983, 1989) and Woodward (2003) develop accounts of causation that put
human action center stage. Cartwright emphasizes that causal regularities must be posited in order
to enact strategies effective at producing desired results. For Woodward, the practical utility of
causal knowledge in manipulation and control is a key motivation for his manipulability account
of causation. This strategy of grounding causal analysis on action, and specifically human action,
is appropriate for a science that is the product of humans. As a result, we should expect the sort
of causal information uncovered by science to be grounded in its application to objects and types
of objects observed by humans, and to be useful in manipulations in the circumstances faced by
humans. One key difference between Cartwright’s and Woodward’s accounts is the role accorded to
singular causation versus causal regularities, or as Woodward puts it, token-causal and type-causal
claims. Cartwright’s skepticism about laws leads her to posit singular causes as basic, from which
causal capacities derive. In contrast, Woodward stresses the scientific significance—and significance
to manipulation—of causal relationships between variables. On his view, understanding of singular
causal relationships derives from these. In this project I adopt Woodward’s manipulability approach
to causal analysis. However, as will become clear below, I remain mute on the metaphysics of
causation.
The two core concepts for Woodward’s manipulability account of causation are intervention and
invariance. A variable X is a direct cause of a variable Y (with respect to a set of variables V ) just
in case a possible manipulation, or intervention, on X changes the value of Y when the values of all
27
other variables in V are held fixed. And then, X is a contributing cause of Y just in case a series
of direct causal relationships leads from X to Y , and an intervention on X changes the value of Y
when the value of all variables in V not in this series are held fixed. Manipulability relations are,
thus, the ultimate guide to causal relations. Then, if X is a cause of Y , that causal relationship
is invariant over some interventions and range of background circumstances. That is, the causal
relationship—how interventions on X change Y —would continue to hold in those circumstances.
Invariance is key to formulating generalizations about causal relationships. Here and in what follows
I articulate a few advantages of this manipulability account. Nonetheless, other difference-making
approaches to causation, such as a counterfactual account like Lewis (2000) provides, might suffice
for my purposes. In what follows I thus often refer simply to a “manipulability or difference-making”
account of causation.
Woodward’s manipulability approach to causation helps overcome one stumbling block that
immediately emerges for the view that science is after partial causal regularities. That stumbling
block is that many partial regularities may not appear to be causal in nature. Consider again
the ideal gas law, PV = nRT . This represents a synchronic relationship that obtains among
several variables; it is not patently a causal representation. Indeed, Salmon (1984) argues that
the ideal gas law does not depict causal relationships. Similarly, equilibrium models, such as
optimality models in evolutionary biology, represent structural features that together determine an
equilibrium point. These have also been construed as non-causal (Sober, 1983; Rice, forthcoming).
However, on Woodward’s conception of causation, applications of both qualify as causal. In a
variety of circumstances, an intervention on the volume of a container would change the pressure
of the gas inside according to the relationship expressed by the ideal gas law. Intervening on the
factors determining an equilibrium point disrupts the expected equilibrium by changing the value
of the equilibrium point or eliminating it entirely. For example, Goss-Custard (1977) develops
an optimality model to account for the preference exhibited by the redshank sandpiper (Tringa
totanus), a bird that feeds on worms in mudflats, for eating large worms over small worms. The
model demonstrates that, if large worms and small worms are both readily available, a redshanks
energy intake is maximized when large worms are chosen. This leads to the evolution of the
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preference in question. But if, for example, large worms were more difficult to find in the bird’s
evolutionary history (an intervention), the preference—or at least the degree of preference—would
be different.
Partial regularities like the ideal gas law and equilibrium models demonstrate a primary
advantage of Woodward’s account of causation. Above I claimed that the manipulability approach’s
focus on human action and control is appropriate for a science developed by human actors.1 This
is apparent in the development and application of partial regularities throughout the scientific
enterprise. Many or even most of those regularities are either distantly related or unrelated to
causal relationships on an approach to causation that emphasizes physical causal processes, such
as mark transmission (Salmon, 1984) or conserved quantities (Dowe, 2000). This is evident in
the charge identified above that such regularities are not causal at all. In contrast, Woodward
directly yokes these regularities to their use in human activity with his account of causation and,
by doing so, demonstrates their scientific purpose. This is why I consider these to be partial causal
regularities.
The exploration of causal influence sometimes involves careful causal diagnosis in one or a
few specific phenomena of interest and other times causal generalizations that apply, at least
approximately, to a wide range of phenomena. The literature on mechanisms indicates that
sometimes other kinds of dependence, such as compositional or organizational dependence, are also
investigated. Yet despite this variety, all involve the search for causal dependencies, understood
as regularities in how systems’ features change in response to changes to other features. The
representation of causal dependencies is thus largely what is accomplished by the partial regularities
established in science. This construal also furnishes some justification for why such regularities
are sought. As Woodward’s approach makes salient, capturing causal dependencies is key to
action, to exerting influence over our world. With this understanding of causal dependence, it
is a natural step from recognizing the search for partial regularities to the search for partial causal
regularities. I thus maintain that science is, in large part, constituted by the search for partial
1Notice, however, that Woodward’s concept of an intervention does not require the real possibility of human
action. The concept of intervention is grounded on familiar human action, but is then generalized to include also
interventions that humans are not in the position to perform. This is crucial for the success of Woodward’s analysis
of causation.
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causal regularities. This search takes many forms, as will become apparent in Chapter Three. The
regularities are partial in the sense that they have a limited domain of applicability and are of
limited accuracy even within that domain, as seen above. The regularities are causal in the sense
that they provide information about how changes—including, significantly, human interventions—
influence other phenomena. This is what distinguishes the hunt for partial causal regularities from
the hunt for laws of nature. Universal, exceptionless generalizations are largely unavailable. As
Cartwright (1983), Giere (1999), and others have shown, even the most apparent scientific laws are
limited in scope and have exceptions. What science generates instead of laws are rules of partial
control, i.e., statements of partial causal regularities.
* * *
Causation is, of course, a metaphysically charged topic. There is a question of what (if anything)
the causal relation really is. There are at least two positions one might have on the metaphysical
status of a manipulability approach to causation. One might offer this as an analysis of what
causation at root is; it seems Woodward has this in mind. Woodward (2007) expresses doubt
that causal claims are grounded in fundamental physical causal relationships. Instead, in his view,
“macroscopic causal claims (like ‘chances’ in a deterministic world) reflect complicated truths about
an (i) underlying microphysical reality and (ii) the relationship of macroscopic agents and objects
to this world” (p.102). Alternatively, one might hold a physical relationship of causation, such
as outlined by Salmon (1984) and Dowe (2000), to be metaphysically basic and conceive of facts
about difference-making as dependent on facts about fundamental causal relationships. Ney (2009)
endorses this view.
As far as the present project is concerned, either of these positions on the metaphysics of
a manipulability account of causation may be correct. Causal pluralism may also be correct
(Cartwright, 2007). However, there is an important limitation on the relationship between a
manipulability sense of causation and any physical causal relationship that is posited. Facts about
difference-making and manipulation are epistemically more basic. These facts ground our science,
providing the basis for the pursuit of partial causal regularities. In contrast, any account of physical
causation is the product of our best theories of fundamental physics. These theories, no matter how
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secure, presuppose successful scientific reasoning. This is apparent in Ney’s discussion of causal
foundationalism, for she gives the proviso that “to the extent that todays fundamental physics
is true, it provides us with facts about causal relations that obtain at our world” (p.746). This
epistemic limitation of any physical account of causation is significant, for as Ney also points out,
today’s fundamental physics is unlikely to be true, since it is inconsistent. I thus have nothing to say
about the metaphysical foundations of causation, but significantly, the epistemic foundations—the
scientific foundations—of causation lie in facts about intervening on the world to make a difference.
There are two important implications of my neutrality regarding the metaphysics of causation.
First, this obviates a metaphysical commitment to a world in which metaphysically basic causal
relationships hold only approximately and in limited circumstances, as I have argued is so for
the causal regularities uncovered in science. There may indeed be metaphysical laws of nature,
which may or may not be causal in nature, and may or may not govern all features of every
phenomenon. But if there are, science is by and large not in the business of uncovering them—
as we have seen, not even fundamental physics. Whatever the ultimate nature of causation, the
sense of causal relationships employed in scientific reasoning is one applicable to everyday human
experience, including in how we exert our own influence on the world. This is what results in a
science useful to and comprehendible by limited human agents. The priority of a manipulability
or difference-making sense of causation is a first step toward distancing science from metaphysical
import, which will emerge as one of the primary themes of this book. This distancing will be
broadened in Chapter Four.
A second implication is that neutrality on the metaphysics of causation grants my view immunity
from causal exclusion arguments. If nothing is at stake about the metaphysics of causation, then
overlapping and cross-cutting causal stories are wholly nonthreatening. Indeed, one should expect
as much from a manipulability or difference-making approach to causation. Griffiths and Stotz
(2013) agree, for they argue that concerns about causal exclusion do not apply to analyses of
causation such as Woodward’s. I thus do not say anything relevant to the metaphysics of causation
in this project, save for the present argument that we can distance that topic from our investigations
of science, including investigating the scientific role of causal notions.
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2.1.2 Causal Complexity
One of the two bases for this project established in Chapter One is the recognition of pervasive
complexity. The above argument for the centrality of the search for partial causal regularities in
science has provided the groundwork for a more careful characterization of the relevant sense of
complexity. Phenomena that are the target of scientific investigations almost always result from a
wide range of diverse causal influences that interact in complicated ways. Consider the range of
causal influences that come to mind for the trajectory of a forest fire, animals’ traits, and climate
change, to name just a few examples. I term this causal complexity. Causal complexity may not
be overtly controversial, but it is certainly underemphasized, and its implications are accordingly
underappreciated.
Let’s look more carefully at the example of the causal influences on animals’ traits. Any evolved
trait—say, feather color—is influenced by the genes and other factors that together result in the
trait’s heritability; numerous developmental factors influence the trait’s expression; and the trait
has likely also been subject to population-level causal processes such as natural selection and drift.
Most traits are additionally subject to within-lifespan influences, including direct environmental
influences on the trait’s expression. For feather color, for example, certain nutrients may need to be
available in order for the color to be produced. Some of these causal influences occur simultaneously,
others partially overlap, and still others occur at wholly different points in the trait’s causal history.
Many of these causal influences interact. Genetic and developmental factors, for example, can only
exert their influence on a trait in combination with one another.
Untangling such causal complexity is made more difficult by the limitations of our representa-
tions. Depicting the full gamut of causal influences in a single representation is impossible. First
of all, causal histories stretch indefinitely far back in time. Even in a given period of time, there
is often a wide range of influences, as well as interactions among them. For one generation of a
single population of birds, feather color is influenced by genes (probably many, separately or in
combination); developmental processes; environmental factors; and influences like predation. At
least some of these influences exert effects on one another: genes influence development, as does
the environment; predation may influence representation of feather-colors, but feather-color also
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influences survival. Moreover, a delimited set of causal influences can be represented in multiple,
incompatible ways. In other words, the causal space can be parsed in different ways. Genes can
be represented in all their molecular glory, or represented more abstractly as Mendelian units of
inheritance, or more abstractly still as simply trait heritability.2
Mitchell (2012b) shows that causal influence need not be modular, either. For Woodward,
the identification of a cause—and, thus, the study of causal relationships—hinges on the ability
to hold fixed all causal factors not on the direct causal path in question. However, this cannot
happen if the influence of a causal factor depends on the other factors present. Mitchell appeals
to an example related to my main illustration here, namely, a gene’s causal contribution to the
production of a phenotypic trait. She points out that one gene in a network may causally contribute
to the production of some phenotypic trait under normal conditions but, when a different gene is
disrupted, have a very different effect (Mitchell, 2012b, p.77). In this case, one cannot hold fixed
the influence of this gene in order to ascertain the causal role of the other gene; the causal influence
is not modular.
This may well show that Woodward’s manipulability account does not provide a sufficient
analysis of causal relationships. But it was established above that, for the present project, we need
not concern ourselves with the metaphysics of causation, but simply with a workable approach to
causal reasoning as it occurs in science. Woodward’s account is specifically tailored to provide the
latter. There is, though, an implication of Mitchell’s point that is significant for present purposes.
It seems modularity is best construed as a feature of our representations of causal relationships, not
of those causal relationships themselves. The failure of modularity that Mitchell demonstrates is
not unusual. Indeed, causal complexity renders it the norm, for modularity fails whenever there are
complex causal interactions. Rather than distinguish causal relationships that are modular from
those that are not, it is more useful to consider how amenable causal relationships are to being
represented as modular. This often depends on what other causal relationships are focal, or in
Woodward’s terminology, the set of variables relative to which the causal relationship is judged.
A similar consequence of causal complexity applies to views that emphasize the centrality of
2See (Longino, 2013) for a detailed study of different parsings of the causal space for the influences on human
behavior. That study is also discussed in Chapter Three.
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mechanisms to various parts of science. Mechanicalness, like modularity, is most productively
construed as a feature of our representations of causal relationships, not as a feature of the world.
Parts of our causally complex world are more or less representable as mechanistic. Pockets of
this world—cellular respiration, DNA replication, chemical transmission at synapses (Machamer
et al., 2000)—are so amenable to representation as mechanisms that they may be confused for
mechanisms. But even in those pockets, causal complexity obtains and results in exceptions to
mechanistic behavior. For example, uncorrected errors in DNA replication are unusual, but they
introduce variability in outcome with significant effects. Sometimes such errors giving rise to cancer,
sometimes to mutations passed down to offspring.
So far I have illustrated causal complexity and indicated a range of ways in which it can
obtain. One might yet wonder how common causal complexity, especially in its more extreme
forms, really is. I can offer two types of justification for a belief in widespread causal complexity.
First, what we know about and are increasingly learning about the world corroborates this view.
There is a proliferation of complex systems approaches in science, applied to a wide range of
fields. I have already surveyed a few examples of these approaches in Chapter One: dynamic
systems theory, developmental systems theory, systems dynamics, chaos theory, and systems
biology. These approaches proliferate because they regularly meet with success. Additionally,
in a range of fields, there is an ever-broadening conception of important causal factors. One
example is the trajectory from the Humane Genome Project to the Thousand Genome Project
to the Human Microbiome Project also described in Chapter One. Finally, I have also surveyed
the increasing appreciation of causal complexity (under a variety of monikers) in philosophy. Any
number of further examples of causal complexity can be generated with the following exercise:
choose any phenomenon investigated in science, then consider the types of causal influences on
that phenomenon. Remember to include background conditions, causes at earlier and later time
periods, and causal influences on the causes you have already identified. When your list grows long,
begin to consider how those influences overlap and influence one another. This is causal complexity.
My second justification for a belief in widespread causal complexity is the significance of partial
causal regularities. The lawlessness of science—viz., the continuing failure to identify laws of
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nature—is itself a corroboration of causal complexity. With multitudinous causal influences,
universal laws are rendered impossible, and we are left with the search for partial regularities
described above. There are other views that could account for lawlessness. Cartwright (1983,
1999) supposes that phenomena in our world are simply unruly. She defends the plausibility of the
idea that nature is “constrained by some specific laws and by a handful of general principles, but
it is not determined in detail, even statistically (Cartwright, 1983, p.49). The downside to such a
position is that it cannot account for the scientific successes we do find, namely the partial causal
regularities that have been discovered for a broad swath of phenomena of interest to us humans. It
is thus the combination of lawlessness and, yet, widespread success with discovering partial causal
regularities, that suggests a world rife with complex and variable causal interactions.
This latter justification for a belief in widespread causal complexity doubles as a reason to
expect causal complexity to bear significant influence on scientific practice. It is because of causal
complexity that our science has grown up as it has, with wide-ranging approaches that each has
some purchase on some phenomena of interest. Discussion of causal complexity will thus recur as
something of a refrain throughout this book. Most immediately, causal complexity is responsible
for rampant, unchecked idealization, the topic to which I now turn.
2.2 Simplified Representation
So far in this chapter I have made the case that science is profitably understood as a search for
partial causal regularities in the face of causal complexity. In this section I explore a widespread
strategy for accommodating this situation, namely, with representations that idealize away much
of the complexity. I begin by surveying existing treatments of the types of idealization in science,
which relate closely to the practice of scientific modeling. I then defend a stronger view of the
significance of idealization in science. I argue that there are not distinct types of idealization,
but many intertwined reasons to idealize. I then make the case that idealizations play a positive
representational role. This also motivates the distinction between idealizations and abstractions.
Finally, I argue that idealizations are both rampant and unchecked in science. By rampant I mean
that idealizations are found throughout our best scientific products, and they stand in for even
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crucial causal influences. By unchecked I mean that little effort is put toward eliminating or even
controlling these idealizations.
2.2.1 Model-Based Science and Reasons to Idealize
My discussion of idealization begins with a brief introduction to the philosophical treatment of
scientific models. The important role that models play in science has, in the past decades, been
increasingly appreciated by philosophers. Hesse (1966) articulated a view of scientific models as
analogies, and she argues that this analogical role is essential to science. A different understanding
of models rose to prominence in philosophy of science with the semantic theory of science (Suppe,
1977), according to which models were understood to be mathematic structures that serve as
interpretations of axiomatic scientific theories. This is consistent with the logician’s sense of models.
Models in this sense were also central to van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism. Giere
(1988) contributed to the prominence of something more like Hesse’s view of models as analogies.
Like Hesse, Giere was struck by the overt idealizations prominent in science textbooks, such as
frictionless pendulums and bodies subject to no external forces. He notes the overlap with logicians’
terminology, but he is critical of the idea that models should be isomorphic to real-world systems.
Instead, on Giere’s view, successful models are related to the world via their similarity. Similarity
is a weaker requirement than isomorphism, and it also requires the specification, at least implicitly,
of the respect and degree of the similarity.
Giere (1988) points out that observations of science as it is actually practiced shows that
models—in his sense—occupy center stage. His view of models has partly inspired a literature on
scientific modeling that emphasizes accounting for the role of models in actual scientific practice.
This accords well with the commitment expressed in Chapter One to account for current science as
it is actually practiced. Additional early inspiration was drawn from Levins (1966), who addresses
population biology in particular, as well as Wimsatt (1987). Distinctive features of this approach
include its focus on models’ incorporation of abstractions and idealizations, and thus only partial
representation of real-world systems, as well as the recognition that models can be employed
independently of theory or without the aim of immediately representing a real-world system.
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Godfrey-Smith (2006) introduced the term model-based science to characterize this approach
to science, based on the construction and analysis of abstract and idealized models. Godfrey-
Smith (2006) and Weisberg (2007b, 2013) both emphasize that this type of modeling is not used
throughout all of science, but is instead a distinctive approach. In an alternative approach that
Weisberg terms abstract direct representation, the aim is simply to describe an actual system in
order to investigate it directly. In contrast, the aim of modeling is to indirectly represent a real-
world system by describing a simpler, hypothetical system and investigating that simpler system, in
order to draw conclusions about the actual system of interest. In virtue of this strategy of indirect
representation, models represent their target systems only partially. They bear some features
in common, while other features are neglected or falsified. This is accomplished via the use of
abstractions and idealizations.
Attention to model-based science is, thus, related to an investigation into the nature
of idealization. As Wimsatt (1987, 2007) says, “Any model implicitly or explicitly makes
simplifications, ignores variables, and simplifies or ignores interactions among the variables in the
models and among possibly relevant variables not included in the model (p.96).”3 These are
all idealizations. Most broadly, idealizations are features of representations that misconstrue the
represented systems. Everyone is familiar with the common assumption in physics of frictionless
planes, and with the common assumption in economics that humans are perfectly rational agents.
We saw above that Newton’s law of universal gravitation also idealizes, for it assumes that each
massive body occupies a single point.
Although model-based science cannot proceed without idealizations, idealizations are not unique
to models. In what follows, I thus refer in general to “representations” that idealize. I mean this
as a neutral term to include models as well as any other representational structures that may be
utilized in science (e.g. Weisberg’s abstract direct representations, theories, and ceteris paribus
laws). I also wish to avoid the questions of what exactly is being represented, as well as the
nature of the representation relation. I adopt Weisberg’s (2013) terminology and speak in terms
of representations of target system(s), but for my purposes this is a placeholder, not a substantive
3(Wimsatt, 1987) is republished as Chapter 6 in (Wimsatt, 2007). All page numbers in my citations refer to the
latter publication.
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assertion about what is represented.
An initial puzzle about idealizations is why, when the aim is to represent one or more systems,
one would intentionally introduce an assumption that is false of those systems. It turns out
that there are several answers to that question. Many different motivations have been suggested
for the incorporation of idealizations. For instance, Cartwright (1983) claims that idealizations
make more illuminating, explanatory models. McMullin (1985) discusses how idealizations
facilitate mathematical or computational tractability. Batterman (2002) emphasizes idealizations’
contribution to accounting for “stable phenomenologies,” or repeated general behavior. Weisberg
(2007a, 2013) assimilates several of these views about the nature of idealization in order to
identify three distinct types of idealization. These include Galilean idealizations, which are
simplifications needed to secure computational tractability, to be eliminated—and the model “de-
idealized” (McMullin, 1985)—if and when it proves possible; minimalist idealization, which is the
elimination of all but the most significant causal influences on a phenomenon; and multiple-
models idealization, which is the use of several distinct models that together shed light on a
phenomenon. Weisberg appeals to different “representational ideals” in order to distinguish among
these types of idealization. Galilean idealizations are employed (and eliminated when possible)
to the end of complete representation, minimalist idealizations facilitate representation of crucial
causes, and—significantly for my purposes—multiple-models idealizations can facilitate a range of
representational ideals. Rohwer and Rice (2013) argue that there is a further type of idealization,
overlooked by Weisberg, which they call hypothetical pattern idealization; this results in a model
that applies to no actual systems but that is helpful in theory-development.
These accounts of idealization indicate that there are a variety of motivations behind the
incorporation of idealizations into scientific representations. Weisberg’s view that no single
motivation accounts for all idealizations must be right. As Weisberg demonstrates, idealizations
serve a wide range of purposes in representations, and the uses of scientific representations vary
greatly as well. Rohwer and Rice’s point that Weisberg’s taxonomy is not adequate to capture
all of the purposes to which idealizations are put must also be right. Weisberg only allows for
idealizations as temporary expedients, or to facilitate the representation of the core causal factors,
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or in combination with other models, employing alternative idealizations. As Rohwer and Rice
note, this overlooks at least one important circumstance in which idealizations are found: idealized
models that obviously neglect important causal factors and yet are not employed in combination
with other models. This circumstance of idealization is very common and, as will become clear
below, crucial to an accurate interpretation of the role of idealization in science.
* * *
There is a crucial flaw in both Weisberg’s and Rohwer and Rice’s attempts to delimit types
of idealization. As a first step toward motivating the problem, notice that almost all of the
circumstances in which idealizations occur fall within Weisberg’s description of multiple-models
idealization. On Weisberg’s analysis, multiple-models idealization occurs when “our cognitive
limitations, the complexity of the world, and constraints imposed by logic, mathematics, and the
nature of representation, conspire against simultaneously achieving all of our scientific desiderata”
(Weisberg, 2013, p.104). I have argued that the effects of causal complexity and cognitive limitations
on science are quite general. Weisberg should agree that this category of idealization is by far the
most significant, for what he characterizes as multiple-models idealization defines model-based
science, which is his main focus. Furthermore, we saw above that multiple-models idealization is
also the type of idealization that on Weisberg’s view is not defined by a single representational
ideal, even though Weisberg proposes that these representational ideals are what distinguish the
different types of idealization. It follows that the most significant type of idealization cannot be
clearly delineated on Weisberg’s taxonomy.
Weisberg might instead delineate this type of idealization by the fact that multiple models
are in use, but this introduces a further difficulty. There are two very different ways in which
multiple models might be in use: within a single research program, or across the scientific enterprise
as a whole. The former is a distinctive approach to science that facilitates comparisons among
models’ assumptions and findings, often used as the basis for robustness analysis (Weisberg, 2006),
whereas the latter is a straightforward consequence of causal complexity and cognitive limitations
and thus obtains quite generally. Which sense of employing multiple models Weisberg intends is
unclear. He appeals to the United States National Weather Service’s practice of employing multiple
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incompatible models, which is an instance of the narrow sense, but he also cites Levins’ view that
“communities of scientists” construct multiple models that “collectively can satisfy our scientific
needs” (p. 104), which suggests the broader sense. This ambiguity may in part account for Rohwer
and Rice’s proposed amendment to Weisberg’s taxonomy, since they focus on idealized models used
singly. Yet simply introducing a fourth category is not the right approach.
Instead, the simultaneous messiness and significance of Weisberg’s category of multiple-models
idealization should be used to motivate the idea that there are not distinct types of idealization
after all. There are, instead, intertwined reasons to idealize.4 As we have seen, the types of
idealization that Weisberg isolates are supposed to be motivated by computational tractability; the
relative unimportance of some causal influences; and tradeoffs in achieving scientific desiderata due
to cognitive limits, complexity, and constraints of logic, math and representation (cf. Levins, 1966).
But surely these reasons to idealize occur in combination with one another. I have suggested that
causal complexity and cognitive limits are quite general features of science. So too is an interest in
expedience, including computational tractability, but also including less lofty versions of expedience,
such as the reapplication of modeling techniques in which a researcher is well-trained to unrelated
phenomena. Rohwer and Rice focus on the identification of general patterns as a motivation for
idealization, and if what I have said in the first half of this chapter about the identification of partial
causal regularities is right, then this motivation too applies quite broadly. All of these reasons to
idealize and more recur in various combinations throughout the scientific enterprise.
There are, then, intertwined reasons to idealize responsible for the idealizations found in
scientific representations. What determines whether the resulting idealizations are temporary, viz.,
whether they should be de-idealized when possible, is a separate question that I will put off until
Chapter Three (in particular, 3.2.1). In that discussion I also suggest grounds for expecting the list
of reasons to idealize to be open-ended. For now, I simply note that some reasons to idealize justify
the incorporation of an idealization merely temporarily, and others justify permanent idealization,
and that some reasons to idealize are due primarily to features of the world and others are due
primarily to features of the scientists investigating that world. These two crosscutting variations
4This point emerged from a discussion with Anthony Chemero, Thomas Polger, and Robert Skipper.
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Due primarily to the world Due primarily to scientists’ features
limits of computational power
Temporary technique happens to get traction familiar technique
preparatory for different approach
computational limits cognitive limits
Permanent captures a partial causal regularity limited research focus
Table 2.1: Some of the intertwined reasons to idealize
among the reasons to idealize result in a handy tool for categorizing them; see Table 2.1.
2.2.2 Idealizations’ Representational Role
Above I considered motivations that have been suggested for the incorporation of idealizations into
scientific representations. I argued that these motivations cannot be neatly distinguished, and that
they are due both to features of the world and features of scientists themselves. Here I shift my
attention from the motivations for idealization to the nature of idealizations themselves. Attending
more closely to what does and does not qualify as an idealization leads to a surprising conclusion:
idealizations play a positive representational role.
To begin, notice that not every difference between a representation and the target system(s)
qualifies as an idealization. Consider, as a toy example, the official map of the Bay Area Rapid
Transit system (BART) in the San Francisco Bay Area. In particular, consider the red coloring
of the map’s depiction of the Richmond line, and that all stops within San Francisco are depicted
as equidistant. Both are differences between the map and the BART system, but only the second
counts as an idealization. One might articulate the relevant difference between these inaccurate
features of the map by pointing out that the map represents the BART lines as if their stops were
equidistant within San Francisco. In contrast, the map does not represent the Richmond line as if
it were red. This same way of distinguishing between idealizations and other differences between
a representation and system(s) is natural for scientific representations as well. Consider again the
simple example of Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Newton’s gravitational law represents
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massive bodies as if they are point masses when they are not; this is a difference between the
law and any system to which it applies that qualifies as an idealization. Newton’s law can also
be written in a mathematical formalism, whereas no system to which it applies can. This is a
difference between the law and the system, but it is not an idealization.
Not all differences between a representation and what is represented count as idealizations. In
both the case of the BART map and Newton’s law of gravitation, one can distinguish between
differences that represent the system(s) as if it had some feature it does not, and differences that
are not naturally construed as representing the system(s) at all, even falsely. The idealizations are
those differences that represent the system(s) as if they had some feature they do not. I propose,
then, that idealizations actually play a representational role. Namely, idealizations represent things
as if something were the case when it is not.
Making this distinction between idealizations and straightforwardly non-representing features
requires reference to something beyond the representation and the system; one cannot read the
difference off the representation itself nor, it seems, off its application. Perhaps, following Weisberg
(2013), the distinction arises from considering the representational aims that have been set for
the model. In any case, the point is that idealizations, despite their falsity, actually have a
representational role to play. An idealization does represent the target system(s), for it represents a
system as if it were some way that it is not. This accounts for the paradigmatic type of idealization,
namely, representing a system as if it were ideal in some regard. A surface may be represented as
if it were a frictionless plane; an individual as if she were a rational agent; a body as if it were
a point mass. Not all idealizations are naturally construed as presenting ideals in this way. The
general insight is that an idealization represents a system as if it possessed some feature(s) that it
does not. Idealization thus must be accorded a positive representational role.
Many distinguish idealizations from abstractions, where the former are features of a system
that a representation misconstrues and the latter are features of a system neglected from a
representation; see especially (Cartwright, 1989). Weisberg (2013) lumps both practices together
into the category of idealization. The proceeding considerations about idealization’s positive
representational role indicates an important difference between abstractions and idealizations.
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Whereas an idealizations represent the target system(s) as if they have some feature they do not,
an abstraction is a way to simply omit representing some feature of the system(s). Abstraction
amounts to ignoring some feature(s), while idealization is representing some feature(s) as if it is
some way that it is not. Idealizations are, then, in a sense fictions.5
What to say, then, about the nature of idealizations’ representational role? Accounts of
representation appeal to the features shared by a representation and that which is represented,
such as their isomorphism (van Fraassen, 1980), analogy (Hesse, 1966), or similarity (Giere, 1988;
Weisberg, 2013). In light of this, it is puzzling how something that is patently false of a system can
represent that system. To begin to address this puzzle, consider effective population size, or Ne,
which is a common variable in population genetics. A popular population genetics textbook (Hartl
and Clark, 1997) defines effective population size as “the number of individuals in a theoretically
ideal population having the same magnitude of random genetic drift as the actual population.” Ne
is thus an idealization. It represents the population of organisms that is of interest as if it were a
size that it is not. Indeed, Ne is defined as the property of a fictional entity—an ideal population. It
represents the real population in virtue of the similarity in the behavior of that population and the
ideal population characterized. Effective population size represents a feature of real populations
not in virtue of a similarity between the population and the described ideal population, but in
virtue of a similarity in their behavior, viz., how they exhibit genetic drift. To generalize from
this observation, idealizations represent systems as if they had some feature(s) they do not, and
idealizations qualify as representational in virtue of the resulting behavioral similarities.
This is fitting. I have argued that much of science is productively understood as the search for
partial causal regularities, and that this provides some of the motivation for the use of idealizations.
Now we see that idealizations represent systems as if they have some feature they do not, a fiction
that is warranted on the basis of behavioral similarities, that is, similarities in the partial causal
regularities they exhibit. Idealizations enable the portrayal of partial causal regularities in virtue
of this representing as if. This results in the elevation of fictional entities—like ideal populations
5That I call idealizations fictions should not be confused with the view that models are fictional systems. I take
no position on the status of models, nor on the question of in virtue of what they represent the world. My attention
here is solely on the idealized parts of models and other representations, and their representational relationship to
the world.
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and frictionless planes—to central roles in scientific investigations. This too is exemplified by
effective population size. Consider how (Lande and Barrowclough, 1987), a heavily cited chapter in
a collection on conservation and population biology, employs the concept. Lande and Barrowclough
say that the purpose of their chapter is to “show how the effective size of a population, the pattern
of natural selection, and rates of mutation interact to determine the amount and kinds of genetic
variation maintained” (p.87). This phrasing suggests an investigation of, in part, the influence of
a property of ideal populations.
We have learned from the literature on model-based science that idealized models can represent
despite their falsity. A stronger position still is that the idealized parts of those models themselves
can represent, despite their falsity. This is a significant departure from how idealizations have
been treated in philosophy of science, but I see no reason to balk at the move. Idealizations
represent features of systems, for they represent those systems as if they possess features that they
do not. This qualifies as representation in virtue of similarities in the behavior of the fictionalized
representation and of the represented system(s), and as such, it contributes to the search for partial
causal regularities. Idealizations, i.e., fictional entities, are thus integral to scientific investigation.
I take up the question of how to make sense of the epistemic value of representing as if in Chapter
Three.
2.2.3 Rampant and Unchecked Idealization
We have seen that idealizations are a central feature of many representations, and that there are
many different reasons to idealize that, in various combinations, motivate the incorporation of
idealizations into representations. I have also argued that idealizations actually play a positive
representational role, representing systems as if they had features they do not. Together these
points about idealization lay the groundwork for the view that idealizations are absolutely central
to science.
There are two parts to this view. The first is that idealizations are rampant in science, by
which I mean that the practice of idealizing is even more extensive than commonly appreciated.
Idealizations exist throughout our best scientific representations. Most basically, this is because
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causal complexity renders idealizations not only helpful, but even requisite in the pursuit of
partial causal regularities. Any choice of causal influences to represent requires some degree of
misrepresentation elsewhere. This is particularly so for representations tailored to human needs and,
thus, human limitations, as our scientific representations are. Misrepresentation, and not simply the
omission of causal influences, is required for several reasons. First, quite many causal regularities
are context-sensitive, so capturing those regularities requires stage-setting. Focal systems must be
represented in ways that reflect the behavioral regularity, and this involves idealizing assumptions
that, as we have seen, represent systems as if they had properties they do not. Second, when there
are many interacting causes, the focus on a subset of causes requires somehow accommodating
the interaction. Third, false assumptions can in many cases facilitate computational tractability.
Finally, misrepresentation instead of omission is in some regards beneficial. Representing as-if is
of practical benefit, for it leads to the reapplication of existing approaches to disparate systems.
It is also of epistemic benefit, for it demonstrates similar behaviors among very different kinds of
systems. These considerations are reflected in the many intertwined reasons to idealize set out
above.
The second part of my view about the centrality of idealizations is that these widespread
idealizations are also unchecked. By this I mean that there is little focus on eliminating such
idealizations, or even on controlling their influence. Weisberg (2007a, 2013) rightly observes that
much idealization is unaccompanied by the goal of eventually reducing or removing the idealizations
to increase the accuracy of representations. The view that the use of idealizations is unchecked
is stronger still. As outlined above, Weisberg’s view accommodates continuing idealization only
when the idealizations stand in for non-difference-makers or when multiple models are employed,
with other models representing the idealized factors. In contrast to that view, difference-makers
are regularly idealized without recourse to multiple models. This is true for highly idealized models
that are not applied to any particular systems, predictive models that sacrifice realistic causal
representation, and many other purposes of idealized representation. The extended examples
discussed at the beginning of the next chapter illustrate this. Many of the permanent reasons
to idealize identified above double as reasons for unchecked idealization. These reasons include
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that, as we have seen, idealizations play a positive representational role, and that the search for
partial causal regularities in the face of causal complexity results in specialized research programs
with limited focuses. For these and other reasons, idealizations positively contribute to achieving
the aims of science, and are thus are both rampant and unchecked in science. This point is the
linchpin of all the ideas about the aims and practice of science I defend in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 3
Science Isn’t After the Truth
A fairly unified picture of scientific practice emerged from the topics addressed in Chapter 2. There
I argued that causal analysis is a central feature of science. More specifically, scientific research
often involves a search for partial causal regularities regarding some phenomenon or phenomena of
interest. Partial causal regularities are the aim by necessity; most phenomena of scientific interest
are the result of complex causal processes that belie singular representation. Indeed, singular
representation would often be of little use, even if it were possible. Accordingly, much of science is
model-based science, and an even greater range of scientific projects involve continuing idealization.
The extent of idealization in science outstrips what most philosophers expect, and the roles it plays
are also more varied than has been appreciated.
This description belies an astounding diversity of scientific projects. This chapter begins with
a small survey of that diversity. Even in these few examples, there is remarkable difference in the
specific aims of the research, the relationship to data, and the type of connection to other research.
The analysis of these research projects and the tremendous diversity among them is the topic of
3.1 below. Despite the many differences among these projects, though, some generalizations can
be made about them. In particular, I will argue in 3.2 that their diverse features have a common
cause, namely, the influence of unchecked, rampant idealization on the aims of science. I thus
develop a revised version of the basic aims of science in light of this reconceptualization. In my
view, science simply isn’t after the truth. Instead, there are a variety of aims that are in tension
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with one another, and the ultimate epistemic aim of science is understanding. Finally, in 3.3, I
explore a related issue, namely, the relationship between science and metaphysics. It emerges that
this conception of the aims of science drives a wedge between scientific practice and any direct
metaphysical implications, which somewhat limits the possibilities for a naturalized metaphysics.
3.1 The Diversity of Scientific Projects
Attending to even a few contemporary scientific research programs reveals a surprising diversity
among the projects. Here I consider investigations of cooperation in behavioral ecology, a variety
of approaches to investigating human aggression, computational models of climate change, fluid
dynamics, and astrophysics. Differences include the aims of the research, the relationship to data,
and how the project connects to other scientific research. Attending to some of the philosophical
issues surrounding these research programs further illuminates their differences. And yet, despite
this diversity, all employ idealized representations. Furthermore, all resist the interpretation that
they are aiming for truth, or even accurate representations in order to generate predictions and
explanations.
3.1.1 Modeling Cooperation
One main research focus in behavioral ecology is the evolution of cooperative behavior, especially
among animals. Historically there have been three main approaches to accounting for cooperation:
a variety of group selection models, kin selection models, and models of reciprocal altruism. Perhaps
the best-known research into the evolution of cooperation is modeling reciprocal altruism using the
prisoner’s dilemma, a game theory model that was first applied to the evolution of cooperative
behavior by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). The prisoner’s dilemma represents a way in which
cooperation can emerge among self-interested individuals faced with particular circumstances;
in its evolutionary interpretation, self-interest simply means maximizing one’s individual fitness.
The prisoner’s dilemma model applies to encounters between organisms in which one strategy
immediately benefits one individual’s fitness at an immediate cost to the other individual’s fitness,
whereas a different strategy is less immediately advantageous but maximizes both individuals’
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fitness in the longterm, provided there are many such interactions.1
This model of the evolution of cooperation is, of course, highly idealized. Assumptions that
are strictly speaking false include the assumption that reproduction is asexual; that the population
is infinitely large; that individuals have serial, pairwise interactions; that payoffs are constant
across individuals and iterations of the game; and that selective advantage is the sole influence on
evolutionary outcomes (Maynard Smith, 1982; Potochnik, 2012; Rohwer and Rice, 2013). Most of
these idealized assumptions are general across all behavioral ecology approaches to modeling the
evolution of cooperation. Those modeling approaches differ in their setups and thus in how they
represent the evolution of cooperative behavior. But all aim to account for the role of natural
selection in producing cooperative behavior, and this focus determines what idealizations are
useful. For example, the assumptions of an infinite population that reproduces asexually allow any
influence of genetic drift or recombination to be ignored. These assumptions also greatly simplify
the representation, thereby facilitating the use of modeling techniques that would otherwise be
unavailable.
The prisoner’s dilemma, then, is a highly idealized model of the evolution of cooperation. As
suggested by the fact that kin selection models and group selection models share many of the
same false assumptions, they too are highly idealized representations of cooperation. Kin selection
models represent how cooperation can emerge among related individuals in virtue of the beneficial
effects to inclusive fitness, viz., the fitness benefits one’s relatives derive from one’s cooperative
actions. Group selection models, in turn, show how cooperation can evolve as a result of how it
improves the fitness of a group of organisms, taken as a whole.
It is instructive to consider the directions in which this behavioral ecology research into
cooperation is progressing. There is an ever-expanding variety of heavily idealized models of
circumstances that generate cooperative behavior, such as other game theory models, like the
stag hunt and snowdrift games. There is also work on the relationships among these alternative
models, like Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002) on the mathematical relationship between game
theory models and group selection models. There is exploration of the variability of the model
1Reciprocal altruism was first articulated by Trivers (1971). This is a very brief overview of reciprocal altruism
and the prisoner’s dilemma, but there is an expansive literature on each.
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structure itself, such as Worden and Levin (2007) on the conditions under which populations might
evolve away from the payoff structure of the prisoner’s dilemma. There are also attempts to
simultaneously represent evolution and within-lifespan influences on cooperation, like Akc¸ay et al.
(2009) on the evolution of mutual regard. All of these are further developments and explorations
of highly idealized, mathematical representations. Many regard the mathematical machinery itself,
without any attention to the representational relationship between the model and actual cooperative
behavior.
Indeed, there are few examples of research that would lead to a more accurate representation
of actual instances of the evolution of cooperation. When specific populations are discussed, they
are almost always used as exemplar cases to motivate a general, idealized model. And quite often,
exemplar cases are not actual phenomena, but imagined, simple scenarios that are evocative of
real phenomena. Similarly, little work has been invested in de-idealization. This would involve
incorporating into a behavioral ecology model more realistic assumptions about the features a
particular population in which a cooperative trait of some kind has evolved, the genetics governing
the inheritance of a cooperative trait, or other central causal influences that existing models wholly
idealize. There thus seems to be little emphasis on applying these models to accurately represent
specific instances of cooperative behavior.
How, then, is this research program related to empirical investigation? Above I claimed that
these models are aimed at accounting for the role of natural selection in producing cooperative
behavior. In (Potochnik, 2009) I call this the weak use of such models, to distinguish it from
the aim of accounting for all significant causal influences. Selection is just one of several causal
influences on actual evolutionary outcomes. These models are, thus, attempts to capture partial
causal regularities—in particular, to show ways in which selection can causally contribute to the
emergence of cooperation. Because these models ignore so many other causal influences, they
have a limited range of application and limited accuracy of most any evolved trait. In Chapter
Two I suggested representations of partial causal regularities generally have both these limitations.
Research such as Eshel and Feldman’s (2001) analysis of the conditions under which evolution can
be expected to lead to game theory equilibria is profitably understood as demonstrating the range
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of these models’ application and its limits. I suspect that the limited accuracy of these models of
cooperation is the reason there is little emphasis on application to specific evolutionary phenomena.
If this is right, then the relationship to empirical investigation is indirect, established by the partial
causal regularities demonstrated in these models.
There are generally two forms of empirical corroboration that might be pursued for these
models of cooperation (cf. Lloyd, 1988). First, researchers sometimes empirically corroborate the
satisfactoriness of a model’s assumptions for a particular population. This corroboration does not
in general involve demonstrating the accuracy of assumptions. As we have seen, many assumptions
of these models are idealizations. Instead, what is corroborated is that the population dynamics can
be represented as if they possessed some feature they do not—asexual reproduction, infinite size,
etc. Second, researchers sometimes empirically corroborate a model’s prediction. In general what
is sought is a qualitative fit. This demonstrates that the representation of natural selection’s causal
role is satisfactory. On the interpretation I am developing here, satisfactory representation requires
both that the posited causal influence is present and that there are not unaccounted-for causal
influences that obliterate the anticipated causal regularity. Beyond the empirical corroboration of
idealized assumptions and qualitative prediction, the bulk of the attention in this research program
is focused on exploration of the nature and extent of the focal partial causal regularity.
This research into the evolution of cooperation has featured in two philosophical debates that
yield additional insight into their nature. First, there is a significant literature in philosophy of
biology on the various approaches to accounting for cooperative and, especially, altruistic behavior
of animals. This is the main type of evolutionary phenomenon addressed in the levels of selection
debate. Sober and Wilson (1998) are influential advocates of the group selection approach as a
“unified evolutionary theory of social behavior.” They argue that cooperative behavior modeled
using evolutionary game theory or kin selection should be acknowledged to involve group selection.
Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002), in turn, show that an individualist perspective, such as provided
by evolutionary game theory, is mathematically equivalent to a group perspective. These authors
argue that each approach has its own “heuristic advantage,” so it is useful to move between these
perspectives. This debate draws attention to the question of whether there is in fact a uniquely
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right approach to modeling the evolution of cooperation, even for one specific instance of an evolved
cooperative behavior.
Second, there is also a substantial philosophical literature on criticisms of evolutionary biology
methodology that Gould and Lewontin (1979) disparagingly dubbed “adaptationism.” As applied
to behavioral ecology models like those considered here, the concern is that it is simply assumed
that traits—including cooperative traits modeled using these approaches—are the direct products
of natural selection. The possibility of a host of other influences, such as genetic and developmental
constraints, is wholly neglected. In part, this criticism is accurate. I have motivated the idea that
these models do focus on the influence of selection. But this is fine so long as there are other
research programs addressing the other significant evolutionary influences. This debate thus draws
attention to the partiality of behavioral ecology models of cooperation.
In summary, idealizations pervade behavioral ecology models of cooperation. Little attention is
paid to the accurate representation of any one system, i.e., any single cooperative trait in a particular
population. The aim instead seems to be to account for the causal role(s) of natural selection in
producing cooperative behaviors. Accordingly, the focus is not on generating actual predictions,
nor accurate representation, but partial, skewed representations. Finally, multiple partial causal
regularities have provided insight into the evolution of cooperative behavior, as demonstrated by
the different behavioral ecology approaches to modeling the phenomenon. It may be that multiple
partial causal regularities provide insight even into individual instances of evolved cooperation.
3.1.2 Studies of Human Aggression
A reasonable response to my analysis in the previous section is to blame the heavy use of
idealizations on the features of behavioral ecology in particular. The focus—the evolution of
cooperative behavior—is an exceedingly broad phenomenon, encompassing a number of specific
behavioral traits across a wide variety of species. Further, the modeling techniques brought to
bear are in large part analytic, mathematical models. These features conspire to provide highly
idealized treatments of general, partial regularities that are not applied in detail to any specific
systems. So let us now shift our attention to a very different type of scientific project: investigations
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of specific human behaviors. Scientific approaches to human aggression and sexuality are the focus
of (Longino, 2013). Here I discuss research on human aggression in particular, and my discussion
relies heavily on Longino’s study. This discussion will have a somewhat different character from
above, since instead of one research program, I will discuss a variety of approaches to studying
aggression.
Human aggression is a research focus in a range of behavioral sciences. Longino (2013) discusses
several of these approaches in depth. Here I will focus on the four that deal most directly with
specific human behaviors, including aggression. For the most part, this discussion follows Longino’s
analysis. Quantitative behavioral genetics employs twin studies to compare the relative influence
of genetic variation and environmental variation on behavioral variation in a population. When
used to study aggression, a proxy for aggression such as antisocial behavior is compared in twins
raised together and raised apart. This is used to estimate the level of heritability for aggression.
What Longino terms social-environmental approaches focus on establishing specific environmental
influences on behavior, including aggressive behaviors. A common strategy is to seek correlations
between specific features of individuals’ social environments and a proxy for aggression. Molecular
behavioral genetics, in turn, attempts to establish associations between specific genes and behavior.
In this research, much attention has been directed to the role of genetic influences on serotonin
metabolism for variation in levels of aggression. Finally, neurobiological approaches focus on the
neural correlates of behavior. Here too serotonin metabolism is a focus, as well as the localization
of brain activity concurrent with aggression.
Longino’s analysis of the relationship among these different approaches to studying human
aggression begins with a list of the broad range of possible causes investigated by one or
more of these approaches. Possible causal influences on aggression include individual alleles, as
well as the genome taken as a whole; intrauterine environment; anatomical and physiological
characteristics; an individual’s environment, the family’s environment, and socioeconomic status
(Longino, 2013, p.127). We can see from this that human aggression is likely to be a causally
complex phenomenon, with diverse types of causal influences operating at different temporal scales,
types of influences that are investigated by different fields of biological and social sciences. Indeed,
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Longino differentiates among the different approaches to studying human aggression according to
which of these possible causal influences they can potentially measure, and which go unmeasured.
It seems that unmeasured causal influences face a variety of fates: some are simply ignored, while
some are assumed not to be causally relevant, despite indications from other investigations that
they are. In either case, these causal influences are set aside in the pursuit of generalizations about
other types of influences.
Longino’s analysis of how these different approaches to human aggression differently parse the
causal space thus demonstrates that each approach neglects a host of other causal influences. That
neglect is achieved with the use of abstractions and, often, idealizations. Twin studies implicitly
assume that the only causal history shared between twins reared apart is genetic, but this is
an idealization, for they also share epigenetic influences and intrauterine environment, at least.
Many neurobiologists assume that the neural substrate is genetically determined, but this is an
idealization, for it has been shown that many neural structures are actually quite malleable. In
the attempt to isolate the causal influence of one or more social influences on aggressive behavior,
social-environmental approaches introduce the idealization that there are no significant genetic or
physiological differences that interact with social differences. In light of all of this idealization, it
appears that these approaches also aim to establish partial causal regularities, viz., information
about how a particular set of causal factors influence the phenomenon under investigation. They
abstract and idealize away from many significant features of the causally complex phenomenon of
human aggression in service of this aim. This is so, even though these research programs all have
the more concrete focus on human aggression in particular.
For this research, it is also interesting to consider the roles played by empirical investigation.
Data is much more relevant to much of this work. All of the approaches to studying human
aggression we have surveyed employ experimentation or other data collection techniques in order
to corroborate or disconfirm specific hypotheses about causal influences on aggressive behavior.
This is almost certainly due to the goal of accounting for the more specific phenomenon of human
aggression, in contrast to behavioral ecology research into cooperative behavior of any kind, in
any species. Yet, because of the idealizing assumptions used to limit the causal factors under
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consideration, the type of data considered by any one of these approaches is highly constrained.
Accordingly, available data is limited to determining the nature of the causal regularity in question.
Significantly less is done to corroborate idealized assumptions than for the behavioral ecology
models of cooperation. Perhaps this is because those assumptions are implicitly acknowledged to
be less well-founded and, accordingly, it is acknowledged that any of this research captures at best
a partial truth about the influences on aggression.
This use of data suggests that, despite the focus on a more specific, limited phenomenon, little
or no attention is directed toward increasing the overall accuracy of the representation of causal
influences. Instead, these different strands of research are pursued largely in isolation from one
another, each with its own body of idealized assumptions. This accords with the form of pluralism
that Longino articulates, which might be called a methodological pluralism (Potochnik, 2013b). On
that view, different approaches to a single phenomenon are irreconcilable, and each offers partial
knowledge—knowledge that is incommensurable because of the different parsings of causal space.
For this reason, the research is of limited predictive value. The accuracy of all of these approaches
is severely constrained by their extensive use of idealizations. These idealizations, by and large,
represent as inactive causal factors that are recognized to be not only relevant, but often even
interacting with the focal causal factors. What this style of idealization does enable, though, is
the promise of intervention. The representational aim of a partial regularity involving one or a few
focal causes increases the potential of this research to facilitate influence on levels of aggression via
control of one of its causes. Different partial causal regularities, and thus different fields of research,
hold the potential for different kinds of interventions, be they neurobiological, hormonal, or social
in nature.
In summary, idealizations are pervasive in these approaches to researching human aggression
as well. Here the focus is a rather specific phenomenon: levels of aggression in human populations.
But even so, these research programs limit themselves to establishing the causal role of certain
types of influences. This is accomplished with various ways of generating empirical confirmation
for specific hypotheses. Yet the extensive idealizations persist. Little attention is devoted to
confirming the adequacy of these idealizations, and they often do a very poor job of reflecting the
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causal influence of neglected factors. No attempts are made to replace these idealizations with more
realistic assumptions. There is a greater focus on accurate representation of a specific phenomenon
than with behavioral ecology models of cooperation, but because the focus is limited to a subset of
causal factors, the result is still partial, skewed representation, with quite limited predictive value.
3.1.3 Physical Sciences
We have now surveyed a couple of research programs in the biological and social sciences and seen
that, despite the variety of their agendas, all are productively understood as the pursuit of partial
causal regularities, facilitated by significant idealizations. It would be reasonable to attribute
those characteristics to the fields of science from which my examples are drawn. After all, some
have argued that these sorts of characteristics distinguish these fields from physics. Rosenberg
(1994), for example, defends a view according to which physics and chemistry aim to describe
reality, whereas the life sciences and social sciences merely aim to furnish us with tools for better
controlling phenomena in these domains. I thus now turn my attention briefly to a few example
research programs from fields of the physical sciences, in particular, climate change science, fluid
mechanics, and astrophysics. Here I rely heavily on others’ work, as my expertise with these fields
is limited.
Climate change science is perhaps not naturally construed as an example of physical science.
Nonetheless, for two reasons I want to start with a discussion of this research. Climate change
research provides a nice contrast to the research discussed so far, insofar as it relies heavily on
computational models and apparently does aim for accurate predictions, as I have argued behavioral
ecology research into cooperation and studies of human aggression do not. It is well established
that anthropogenic climate change has occurred and is continuing. A prominent focus of climate
change research is now to ascertain the extent of future warming and the nature and extent of
climate effects this will produce. Here the focus is not only limited to a single type of phenomenon,
as is research on human aggression, it is limited even to a single phenomenon, that is, the changing
climate on Earth. This system is expansive, and it is extremely causally complex. Winsberg (2010)
demonstrates the value of computer simulations in grappling with such complex phenomena in
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general, as well as with climate change in particular. As indicated above, a prominent research
focus is generating accurate predictions of future states of this system.
Multiple computer models are often developed to tackle a single predictive question. These
models may differ in their assumptions, parameter values, and the type of causal processes
they take into account. A primary strategy for assessing the predictions generated by multiple,
different models is to ascertain what predictions are robust across a range of models with different
assumptions and types of representations. This technique is called robustness analysis. The
idea seems to be that demonstrating that a result holds across a range of different plausible
assumptions and representations of the system indicates that it is not sensitive to any of those
specific assumptions or representational choices, and is thus confirmed as a plausible prediction.
The use of robustness analysis is a topic of philosophical controversy. Orzack and Sober (1993)
criticize the idea that robustness is in general a guide to truth; Weisberg (2006, 2013) responds
to this criticism by outlining how robustness analysis can provide a form of confirmation without
direct empirical support. His analysis, though, is focused on the use of robustness analysis to
ascertain what I would call partial causal regularities—how one or a few factors influence a recurring
phenomenon of interest. Parker (2011) addresses the use of robustness analysis in climate science
in particular, so her treatment is tailored specifically to the aim of accurate prediction. Parker
is critical of robustness analysis’s current ability to support predictive hypotheses. As she notes,
it does not follow from this that climate policy decisions should be postponed until the science is
better. Instead, if Parker is right about the limitations of predictive robustness analysis, climate
science must be taken to have at least two main aims: first, to generate accurate predictions about
future states of the Earth’s climate, and second, to guide policy even in the absence of accurate
predictions.
As this consideration of robustness analysis indicates, in this research as well, there is often an
indirect relationship to empirical confirmation. Individual assumptions and causal hypotheses can
sometimes be confirmed, but not thoroughly enough to identify one or even a few best models. When
it comes to the main predictions, other methods of corroboration are required, which accounts for
the significance of robustness analysis. The prominent use of robustness analysis suggests that, in
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this research program, predictions or accurate policy guidance are sought at the expense of accurate
causal representation or explanation. Nonetheless, a specific set of partial causal regularities is
sought here as well. The primary causal interest regards the relationship between human influences
on climate—a particularly significant example is carbon emissions—and predicted future scenarios.
A full account of the causally complex system, or even of the variety of relevant factors, is less
important than an appreciation for the causal role of the factors over which we humans might exert
control.
I now briefly consider the nature of two types of research in the physical sciences that others
have used to exemplify the significance of idealizations. First, Batterman (2009) makes the case
that idealizations are essential to a “full understanding” of some physical phenomena. One of his
examples regards the hydrodynamical discontinuity that occurs when water drips from a faucet,
and a single mass breaks into two or more droplets. So the attention here is on a highly general but
precisely defined phenomenon. It is plausible that the same types of causal influences are active
in determining the shape of the fluid at the point where it breaks (the singularity), namely the
velocity of the fluid and curvature at the breaking point. Yet, as Batterman shows, this is “a difficult
and complex moving boundary value problem” (p.434). What enables a solution are simplifying
idealizations that can be made as the breaking point is approached, but not otherwise: first, that the
water is a vertical line; second, that there is no acceleration due to gravity; and third, that axial and
radial length are arbitrarily small. Batterman demonstrates how these idealizations can be justified
by properties of the phenomenon in question. According to him, they serve a methodological role,
for they enable exact solutions to the relevant equations, as well as an explanatory role, for they
demonstrate why different fluids, dripping from nozzles of different shapes and sizes, have the same
shape at the breaking point.
This is an essential use of idealizations in physics. This research is similar to behavioral ecology
research into cooperation insofar as both attempt a highly general account of a broad phenomenon.
In the process, both incorporate idealizations that enable the neglect of many influences on the
phenomenon. Both also involve some attention toward justifying those idealizations. At least
superficially, the considerations Batterman surveys that enable the simplifying assumptions are of
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a different sort than in the behavioral ecology case. They regard geometrical relationships, such
as between the axial and radial extension of a water drop, and claims about causal significance
motivated by considering the models themselves, viz., the structural equations, such as the claim
that surface tension, viscous forces, and inertial forces are of equal importance. In contrast, we saw
that idealizations in models of cooperation are often justified by direct empirical corroboration, or
else left unjustified. A further similarity is that each type of research results in a generalization
about a partial causal regularity. It seems limitations and exceptions are relevant in this case from
fluid mechanics also. Batterman says, of the simplified treatment that enables application to a
wide range of scales, “to a large extent and for a wide range of fluids, this turns out to be the case”
(p.435).
Kennedy (2012) also argues in favor of the centrality of idealizations to research in the physical
sciences, and in particular, astrophysics. She bases her argument on two examples, one of which is a
model designed to provide the probability of observing a cometary maser (microwave amplification
by stimulation emission of radiation) from the ground. As Kennedy describes it, this model was
constructed in response to researchers coming up empty handed when they searched for maser
emission from the comet Hale-Bopp. The model employed several idealizations, including the false
assumptions that jets are the only cometary source of masers and that jets are located at either
the pole or nucleus of a comet. The model identified geometric reasons for the absence of maser
observations for Hale-Bopp. As Kennedy describes,
The jet must be located along the line of sight of the observer in order to be detectable,
the angle between the jets axis and the Sun-comet line must be small in order for the
Sun to efficiently heat the hot spot and cause gas sublimation, and the angle between
the normal and the Earth-comet line must be small in order to allow for detection of a
maser. This sort of favorable geometrical setup only very rarely occurs during a random
search (p.329).
In this case, idealizations are used to secure the model’s computational tractability, and there
seems to be little focus on justifying their well-foundedness. Interestingly, the aim of this research
is explicitly construed as accounting for scientists’ observations—or lack thereof—and to provide an
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account of the conditions required for desired future observations (of cometary masers). The result
seems to be largely of theoretical significance, with little attention to direct empirical confirmation.
It is clear that the geometric considerations are intended to apply quite generally and, it would
seems, suggest a revision of research strategies in astrophysics along the lines of abandoning random
searches for masers from the ground.
In this section I have surveyed three types of research in the physical sciences, and the
conclusions I made about my earlier case studies apply to this research as well. Even in the
small sampling of scientific research I have described so far in this chapter, there is an astounding
diversity of aims and methods. The goals of these research projects vary from accounting for the
causal role of one factor in producing a very general, heterogenous phenomenon in the case of the
evolution of cooperation, to accounting for the action of certain types of factors in the more specific
phenomenon of human aggression, to issuing specific predictions and guiding policy decisions in the
case of climate science. A large variety of roles are played by data, but direct, empirical confirmation
of a prediction is not a frequent occurrence. Many do make significant contact with the goal of
illuminating partial causal regularities, although this too occurs in different ways. Variations include
what types of causal factors are focal, as well as the principles governing the selection of those focal
factors; whether the aim is to illuminate a general causal role, or causal action in more specific, set
circumstances, or to treat causal influences so as to maximize predictive accuracy.
I have come nowhere near to cataloging the full diversity of the aims and methods of science.
The purpose of this exercise was, first, to take a step back from the across-the-board generalizations
I made in Chapter Two about the aim of illuminating partial causal regularities. Partial causal
regularities are certainly more central to science than are laws of nature, but which are significant
and the nature of that significance can vary. Second, it is remarkable that even with all of the
differences among the varieties of scientific research I have discussed, all prominently employ
idealizations. Lastly, all of this diversity begins to suggest that science does not proceed in lockstep
toward truth, in the hopes of generating accurate predictions and fulfilling explanations. Something
very different—and much messier—is going on.
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3.2 Redefining the Aims of Science
In Chapter Two, I established that there are several intertwined reasons to idealize; that
idealizations play a positive representational role; and that there is rampant, unchecked idealization
throughout the scientific enterprise. In 3.1 I showed that those idealizations are present for different
reasons, accomplish different ends, and different steps are taken to accommodate them. Yet they
are not eliminated, nor are they minimized. One common view is that all of this idealization may
be necessary, and that it might be here to stay, but that it results in representations that are
lacking in various ways. Accordingly, the view goes, we must look for a subsequent step, a way
to connect these idealized representations to the successful pursuit of the aims of science, whether
those are prediction, empirical confirmation, explanation, true representation, etc. The textbook
version of this view would hold that science aims for truth, and so idealized representations must
be de-idealized in order to be useful. It seems that Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011) assumes
something like this view, for they argue that without the removal of all idealizations—complete
de-idealization—we have “no ground, beyond that of our background knowledge that informed
the model, for claiming that the model specifies a causal relation” (p.765). Odenbaugh and
Alexandrova conclude that even the use of multiple models, with different idealizations, cannot yield
the description of a causal mechanism. Thus, they claim, this does not allow for the confirmation
of models, nor can it generate explanations.
Other versions of this view do not hold de-idealization to be necessary, but still anticipate the
need to bridge the gap between idealized models and the traditional aims of science. Wimsatt
(2007), for instance, argues that idealized, “false” models can be used to produce “truer” theories
without recourse to de-idealization. Similar to Odenbaugh and Alexandrova’s concern with
causal description and explanation, Rohwer and Rice (2013) argue that at least one purpose of
idealizations, namely the investigation of general patterns across heterogenous systems, prevents
the accurate description of causal factors and, thus, the formulation of explanations (though they
hold that resultant model may still be explanatory). These views all endorse the continuing practice
of idealization, but they also hold idealized models to be somewhat distant from the traditional
aims of science. They accordingly explicitly or implicitly commit themselves to an intermediary
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step of some kind between idealized representation and achieving the aims of science. On this
strategy, even though idealized representations are of scientific value, they are not sufficient to
provide adequate explanations, trustworthy predictions, causal representation, etc.—at least not
by themselves.
One might instead take a very different approach to reconciling idealizations and the aims
of science. The observation of rampant and unchecked idealization in science, and the distance
between idealized representations and traditional articulations of the aims of science, might be seen
as grounds for concluding that those traditional articulations of the aims of science are incorrect. On
this alternative approach, nothing has gone wrong with or is lacking from idealized representations,
and no intermediary step is needed for idealized representations to achieve the aims of science.
Those aims just stand in need of clarification. This is the tack I take here. I defend the view that,
in an important sense, science is not after the truth. That is, much of science resists interpretation
as successive approximation or increasingly accurate representation. A result of rampant, unchecked
idealization is that the immediate products of science are not things we believe to be true.
3.2.1 The Epistemic Value of Understanding
Wimsatt (2007) rightly points out, regarding idealized models, that “unless they could help us do
something in the task of investigating natural phenomena, there would be no reason for choosing
model building over astrology or mystic revelation as a source of knowledge of the natural world”
(p.101). This must be right; models, even with all their falsity, must get us somewhere that, for
instance, mystic revelation does not. At issue is how to understand what idealized models are
helping us accomplish. In my view, false models are not a means to truer theories, as Wimsatt
believes, but themselves accomplish the end goals of much of science.
Above I discussed how behavioral ecology, molecular genetics, and climate science all persist
in the use of idealizations. Even in these few examples, the idealizations are present for different
reasons and different steps are taken to accommodate them. But in each case, there is apparently
little interest in attempting de-idealization. The goals of using idealized models vary, but in none
of these examples is the goal to attain a more accurate representation of a specific target system.
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I argued that the goal of the behavioral ecology research into cooperation is to represent general
causal dependencies without representing or predicting any features of particular target systems.
In the molecular genetics research, the goal is instead to represent specific causal relationships—
between individual genes and phenotypic traits—at the expense of generalizations about these
factors’ causal roles as well as representation of all the other causal factors as work. Finally, for
certain computational models of climate change, the goal is accurate prediction without any care
for accurately representing the causal structure. These examples and, I believe, much of scientific
research resists interpretation as aiming for the truth, successive approximation, or increasingly
accurate representation.
A first step toward a more promising conception of the aims of science is provided by Elgin
(2004). Elgin is also impressed by how many scientific laws, models, and theories diverge from the
truth in various ways. Her aim is thus to show how these scientific products can be epistemically
acceptable without being true. In her view, this is because they produce understanding. So,
according to Elgin, a focus on truth should be replaced by a focus on understanding. She says,
I take it that science provides an understanding of the natural order. By this I do not
mean merely that an ideal science would provide such an understanding or that in the
end of inquiry science will provide one, but that much actual science has done so and
continues to do so (p.114, emphasis in the original).
Elgin’s position results from accepting today’s actual science as a successful venture, then looking
to see what this science accomplishes. Rather than make excuses for the myriad ways in which our
science falls short of truth, Elgin reconsiders the nature of epistemic success. This is reminiscent
of the approach to this book outlined in Chapter One.
Elgin thus conceives of the epistemic success of science as understanding, which she distances
from truth. Truth does not disappear from this picture; instead, it functions as a threshold concept.
According to Elgin, a claim must be “true enough,” and this requires that any divergence from
the truth be negligible, that is, “safely neglected.” Whether this is so depends on the function
a claim plays in an argument, explanation, or theory—or, one might add, in a model or other
representation. One of Elgin’s examples is Snell’s law, which governs the angle of refraction of light
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when it passes from one medium to another. Elgin notes that Snell’s law is only true of optically
isotropic media, but it is true enough of media that are nearly isotropic, which includes a wide
range of media in which physicists are interested.
This suggests an amendment that must be made to Elgin’s view. Whether a claim is true enough
depends not only on its function in, say, a representation, as Elgin notes. It also depends on the
purpose to which that representation is put. Elgin points out that Snell’s law applied to anisotropic
media is of limited use “if we are interested only in the path of a particular light ray,” but is useful
“if we are interested in optical refraction in general” (p.118). This divergence in whether or not
Snell’s law is true enough cannot be accounted for solely by referencing the role played in the law by
the assumption of isotropic media; it requires reference to the researchers’ different aims, viz., what
they intend to get out of an application of the law. This is a minor expansion of the recognized
influences on a claims’ epistemic acceptability, but it hints at a much more significant shortcoming
of Elgin’s view that will be addressed below.
For now, notice that Elgin’s proposal of distancing the epistemic success of science from truth
is not as radical as it might at first appear. Elgin clarifies her position by adding, “I do not then
claim that it is epistemically acceptable to believe what is false. . . Rather, I suggest that epistemic
acceptance is not restricted to belief.” She continues, “understanding is often couched in and
conveyed by symbols that are not, and do not purport to be, true” (p.116, emphasis in original).
Epistemic acceptance, then, is supposed to be a broader category than belief, and understanding
is supposed to be sometimes “couched in” symbols that are not true. Elliott (2013) argues that
scientists adopt a number of different cognitive attitudes toward the products of science, and he
follows Cohen (1992) in distinguishing between accepting and believing a body of content, such as
a hypothesis, theory, model, or other representation. It seems Elgin takes a similar approach, and
then yokes understanding to acceptance—or, as she puts it, epistemic acceptance—rather than to
belief.
Distancing scientific success from truth in this way is a natural first step toward redefining the
aims of science in light of rampant and unchecked idealization. Elgin argues that such “felicitous
falsehoods figure in cognitive discourse not as mistaken or inaccurate statements of fact, but as
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fictions” (p.123), and that these fictions facilitate understanding, for they “impose an order on
things, highlight certain aspects of the phenomena, reveal connections, patterns and discrepancies,
and make possible insights that we could not otherwise obtain” (p.127). She gives the example of
drawing a smooth curve and treating the data’s deviation from the curve as error or noise. This
view nicely accommodates the positive representational role that I have defended for idealizations.
In Chapter Two I suggested that idealizations are fictions in the sense that they represent system(s)
as if they have some feature they do not, to the end of capturing a partial causal regularity. This
accords with Elgin’s account of how felicitous falsehoods facilitate understanding. My answer
to Wimsatt’s challenge of articulating the epistemic value of idealized models above, say, mystic
revelation is that these provide understanding. Idealizations are thus not preparatory to truer
theories, but contribute directly to understanding.
* * *
Elgin’s focus on understanding is a move in the right direction, namely away from a truth-centric
conception of science and toward a conception of science’s aims that better accords with rampant
and unchecked idealization. However, the resulting view is still too conservative of traditional
conceptions of the aims of science. Elgin says, of the ideal gas law:
The model is illuminating though, because we understand the properties of real gases in
terms of their deviation from the ideal. In such cases, understanding involves a pattern
of schema and correction. We represent the phenomena with a schematic model, and
introduce corrections as needed to closer accord with the facts (p.127).
This sounds awfully like the traditional view that I outlined above, where idealizations are seen as
distortions, to be overcome or circumvented in the pursuit of truth, or for Elgin, to “accord with
the facts.”
Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that Elgin speaks as if all of science generates claims,
claims that figure into arguments, explanations, or theories. We saw in Chapter Two and in 3.1
above that this is wrong. Model-based science may proceed largely independently from theory, and
there is a diverse array of scientific products, many of which have little or no relationship to theory
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or explanation. This broader conception of scientific products requires that Elgin’s definition of
“true enough” be significantly revamped. Her proposed standard of negligible divergence from
truth, taking into account a claim’s role in an argument, explanation, or theory, is still too truth-
conservative. This can be seen from Elgin’s treatment of the ideal gas law. For many scientific
projects, a schematic model will suffice. Such projects would be hindered, not furthered, by closer
accordance with the facts. Elgin later says, “if, for example, evidence shows that friction plays
a major role in collisions between gas molecules, then unless compensating adjustments are made
elsewhere, theories that model collisions as perfectly elastic spheres will be discredited” (p.129).
But this too is wrong. There may be perfectly good reasons—including epistemic reasons—to
continue to model gas-molecule collisions as if they were collisions among perfectly elastic spheres,
even if the theory that they are similar to perfectly elastic spheres is discredited. In these cases
too, partial causal regularities may be revealed, that is, regularities in the causal contribution of
factors other than friction. We have seen that idealizations play a much broader role than simply
standing in for factors that are not difference-makers. There are quite many reasons to represent
as-if.
There is a second regard in which Elgin’s account is too conservative of traditional conceptions of
the aim of science. Elgin focuses exclusively on science’s purely epistemic role, viz. the production of
understanding, but science plays a wide range of roles. Some are epistemic, such as understanding;
others non-epistemic, such as action within a short timespan; and still others seem to involve both
epistemic and non-epistemic elements, such as accurate prediction (cf. Elliott, 2013). Instead of
a single successor aim for truth, we should thus expect a variety of scientific aims, which suit
science to the range of roles it plays. The list of science’s roles must be open-ended, for science is a
continually creative process. The procedures, as well as the products, are always in development.
Nonetheless, some generalizations can be made about these aims. First, many relate in one way
or another to establishing and employing partial causal regularities, as I set out in Chapter Two.
Second, all of these aims further cognition, action, or both; indeed, significantly, they further human
cognition and action, as a science by and for human beings should.
These criticisms of Elgin’s view demonstrate the features that a reconstrual of the aims of
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science must possess in order to succeed. First, it must be acknowledged that science has a variety
of aims. Understanding replaces truth as the ultimate purely epistemic aim of science. However, it
is not the ultimate aim of science simpliciter. There are important non-epistemic aims of science,
and likely aims that involve both epistemic and non-epistemic elements as well. Second, it must be
acknowledged that what best facilitates understanding is not determined solely by the relationship
between a representation and the world. What best facilitates understanding—and thus, in Elgin’s
terminology, what qualifies as “true enough”—depends also on a range of considerations about
scientists themselves. Those considerations include, prominently, the scientists’ particular research
interests, but also their cognitive faculties and psychological characteristics, their temporal and
spatial location, etc. This move resolves the difficulties identified in Elgin’s interpretation of
the role of the ideal gas law and, it stands to reason, of other heavily idealized representations.
Idealizations, no matter how little they resemble the systems they represent, may nonetheless
facilitate an understanding of those systems in the context of a science that is, ultimately, a human
creation.
Each of the intertwined reasons to idealize identified in Chapter Two (in particular 2.2.1), it
now emerges, is valuable for its ability to facilitate understanding or some other aim(s) of science.
Here I continue to focus on idealizations’ role in the production of understanding, the narrowly
epistemic aim of science; in the next section, I widen my focus to also consider the relation to other
aims of science. As indicated in Table 2.1, some reasons to idealize are temporary and others are
permanent. Which is the case is determined by whether an idealization facilitates understanding
for a reason only relevant to the current stage of scientific inquiry or of enduring relevance. For
instance, an idealized model may better facilitate understanding because of a limitation in our
current computational powers or because of an absolute computational limit. Other temporary
reasons to idealize include what modeling approaches happen to be close at hand, or familiar to the
researcher(s); what technique happens to get initial traction with a system of interest; and what
modeling technique best positions the researcher(s) to transition to a less idealized, more successful
approach down the road. But many reasons to idealize are due to idealizations’ enduring ability to
facilitate understanding. Reasons that justify permanent idealizations include cognitive limitations
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of the researchers or their audience such that an idealized model best leads to understanding; the
depiction of a partial causal regularity; and a research program with a limited focus furthered by
the idealization in question.
A few elements of how these intertwined reasons to idealized facilitate understanding bear
mentioning. First, notice that some reasons to idealize—both temporary and permanent—are due
to features of scientists or, sometimes, the audience for their science, including other scientists,
policy-makers, or the lay public. This is at is should be, for we have seen that what best facilitates
understanding depends in part on considerations about scientists themselves. Second, we should
expect there to be an open-ended list of reasons to idealize. Idealizations can contribute to the
production of understanding in many ways, depending on the features of phenomena of interest,
as well as the background concerns and characteristics of the scientists. The wide range of reasons
to idealize results, ultimately, from limited human cognizers grappling to understand our causally
complex world.
Finally, it is significant that an idealization may be radically untrue, that is, quite different from
the true state of affairs, but nonetheless facilitate understanding. Elgin (2004) points this out. She
discusses the example of assuming mutually disinterested agents, an assumption that appears in a
range of social science contexts. Another example is the common assumption in population genetics
that a population is of infinite size. An even stronger point is that a radically untrue idealization
may facilitate understanding in virtue of its distance from the truth. As Strevens (2009) argues, a
radically untrue idealization can facilitate understanding when the idealized factors are irrelevant
by advertising their unimportance. But in my view this does not exhaust this style of idealization’s
contribution to understanding. Above I established that idealizations can facilitate understanding
not only in virtue of their relationship to the world, but also in virtue of their relationship to those
seeking to understand the world. This is so for radically untrue idealizations as well. Assumptions
like mutually disinterested agents and infinite population size can also serve to advertise not that
a factor is causally irrelevant, but that a factor is irrelevant to the current research focus. This
reason to idealize is particularly useful in the pursuit of partial causal regularities.
At first glance, this account of the epistemic aim of science might seem to offer a terribly
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subjective standard for success. There is one subjective element of the account. The view that
understanding is the ultimate epistemic aim of science posits a subjective standard for epistemic
success, for the satisfaction of that standard is dependent on the features of the practitioners of
science. This is because the features of scientists help determine what best facilitates understanding.
But this element of subjectivity is unproblematic. Indeed, it is to be expected for an account
of the scientific enterprise that has been developed by limited and historically located human
beings. What best meets human requirements—including our requirements of knowledge—depends
in part on the features of humans. Other forms of subjectivity that would be problematic do
not apply. One need not rely on the subjective experience of an “aha!” moment in order to
judge whether a representation facilitates understanding. Instead, objective reasons guide that
judgment. A representation must be accurate in the anticipated respects (cf. Elgin, 2004), and
the respects in which it is inaccurate must each be justifiable by an increase in understanding.
The relative judgment of whether an inaccuracy—an abstraction or, especially, an idealization—
increases understanding is based on objective features of the world and of scientists themselves.
This is recognizable of each the reasons to idealize I have outlined. Limited computational power
and absolute computational limits; the limitations of human powers of cognition and the limitations
in one researcher’s training; the existence of a partial causal regularity and the existence of specific
research interests: these are all objective features of the world under investigation and the scientists
leading that investigation that together determine what best generates human understanding.
* * *
There is a startling consequence to this conception of the aims of science. Namely, it unseats
truth as the ultimate epistemic aim of science and, thus, introduces the possibility that the products
of science are not things we believe to be true. There is, of course, something true, or rather
“true enough,” about the products of scientific research. They generate understanding and are
accordingly on epistemically firm footing, whereas mystic revelation is not. But the threshold for
“true enough,” on my reconstrual of this requirement, is quite low and is also relative to the features
of scientists and their specific projects. In my view, science simply is not after the truth.
Although this may be a startling consequence, it is not problematic when properly understood.
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To begin with, the idea that science does not aim at truth, but rather understanding, should not be
confused with a version of antirealism. The issue of realism versus antirealism is nearly orthogonal
to the present discussion. In its most abstract formulation, that debate regards whether our best
science has achieved epistemic success, or alternatively, whether science aims to achieve epistemic
success (Chakravartty, 2013). I have not challenged the idea that there is an epistemic aim to
science; my criticisms are of the idea that this aim is best articulated as truth. The considerations
raised here do, then, draw into question any version of realism that articulates that epistemic success
as truth or even approximate truth. But other articulations of realism are readily available. In
turn, that I have posited an epistemic aim for science is opposed to purely instrumentalist versions
of antirealism. In the first section of this chapter, we saw that science is in part after predictions,
but many of its activities belie that description. Any accurate construal of science must account
for both its epistemic and non-epistemic aims. To state the point generally, the position developed
here constrains what form of a realism or antirealism one might take, but it does not pretend to
settle that issue.
Yet my position that science does not aim for truth does seem to be susceptible to some
concerns similar to ones that have been raised against antirealist positions. One such concern is
that denying science truth leads to an untenable distinction between ordinary everyday truths and
scientific claims of the same style that I must deny are true. For example, it is true that, at the time
of writing this sentence, I live in the city of Cincinnati. Is it not also true that, say, humans and
chimpanzees share a common ancestor? As this illustrates, many downstream products of science
are indeed true—or at least as true as analogous commonsense claims. But in my view, this extends
only to the rather simple, concrete claims that sometimes result from successful scientific ventures.
Quite many other claims and representations generated in science are not straightforwardly true.
Generalizations that capture partial causal regularities have exceptions, and an even broader range
of representations incorporate untruths in the form of idealized assumptions. These are vehicles of
scientific understanding, but they are not straightforwardly true. Truth in science is limited to the
particular and to the partial, viz., the true enough.
This position is consistent with Longino’s (2001) suggestion that the measure of scientific success
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should be broadened from truth to what she calls “conformation.”2 Longino proposes this as an
umbrella term for the epistemic success of any scientific content, which comes in degrees and
in different respects. On her view, conformation is more precisely defined locally, in different
arenas of science. Truth is a form of conformation, as is isomorphism, homomorphism, similarity,
etc. Considered in its relationship to this idea, my proposal is that conformation, viz. epistemic
success in science, is not often defined as truth, nor even accurate representation (or isomorphism,
homomorphism, etc.). Instead, the epistemic success of science most often consists in partial
similarity in some very limited respect.
One may wonder how different this position really is from existing treatments of idealization.
After all, two of the three practices of idealization that Weisberg (2007a) discusses need not
involve de-idealization. Rohwer and Rice (2013) go further by also endorsing idealizations
that omit important causal influences. Yet the position I endorse here additionally elevates
the role of continual idealization, and it thereby requires revamping the very aims of science.
Weisberg’s minimalist idealization and multiple-models idealization may not involve a promise of
de-idealization, but each does provide an alternative way to keep idealizations in check. Minimalist
idealization does not idealize any central causal factors, while multiple-models idealization involves
the use of different models that more accurately represent what the others idealize. Weisberg thus
allows for continual idealization but not unchecked idealization. In contrast, I have suggested that
it is commonplace to have unchecked idealization even of important causal influences. Rohwer and
Rice’s hypothetical-pattern idealization looks very much like the practice I identify in behavioral
ecology models of cooperation. However, in contrast to that view, I suggest that these idealized
models are full-fledged, successful products of science. Rohwer and Rice deem these models
explanatory, but they argue that they fall short of providing explanations. They thus account for
idealization, yet keep it at a remove from full scientific achievement. I take the opposite approach
by reconsidering the nature of scientific success, viz. the aims of science, in light of the pervasive
practice of unchecked idealization.
2Though this word is only one letter distant from “confirmation,” a term also of scientific significance, there is no
relation between the concepts.
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3.2.2 Separate Pursuit of Science’s Aims
If the position developed above is right, the epistemic aim of science is not truth, but understanding.
Yet, as I have already acknowledged, there are a variety of aims of science, both epistemic and non-
epistemic. Traditionally appreciated aims include (at least) accurate prediction, explanation, and
representation. Other aims of science have recently received increasing attention. These include
providing information to guide policymaking (Douglas, 2009b); action within a short timespan
(Elliott, 2013); and facilitating the public uptake of scientific knowledge (Elliott, 2011). There are
surely many other aims and, indeed, many other existing articulations of these and other aims. My
project here is not to delineate the range of scientific aims; above I suggested that we should expect
an open-ended list of aims. My goal is instead to examine the relationship among the various aims
of science. In particular, I suggest that it is the norm for the pursuit of one aim to occur at the
expense of others. Successful pursuit of one among the various aims of science generally inhibits
success with other aims. Accurate prediction is achieved by tools poorly suited to explain; the
aim of quick action is at odds with full causal representation; etc. At root, this is because the
different aims of science are furthered by different means. This too traces back to the centrality of
idealizations in science.
Notice first that the diversity of scientific aims is linked also to a diversity of cognitive attitudes
toward the products of science. Recall from above that embracing understanding, instead of truth,
as the epistemic aim of science requires shifting from a focus solely on belief to the broader concept
of acceptance. This is because many aids to understanding are not things we believe to be true. I
followed Elgin in phrasing the alternative, broader concept “epistemic acceptance.” But acceptance,
like the aims of science themselves, comes in many varieties. Elliott and Willmes (2013) define
acceptance as follows: “S accepts that h, iff S presupposes h for specific reasons in her deliberation”
(p.5). This definition can yield the subspecies of epistemic acceptance by restricting the relevant
specific reasons to the furtherance of understanding. In this way, one can generate other varieties of
acceptance by focusing on other, specific aims of science. For instance, acceptance as predictively
useful amounts to presupposing for purposes of predictive value (alone). It is clear that one form of
acceptance need not entail another. The value of an assumption in the production of understanding,
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for example, suggests nothing about its predictive usefulness.
Just as one form of acceptance need not entail another, the pursuit of one aim of science need
not contribute to other aims. Indeed, something stronger is true: success with one aim often
inhibits success with other aims. Science as a whole employes a variety of tools to achieve, e.g.,
predictions, explanations, causal representations, and the basis for action. What suits a tool to
further one of these aims does not well suit it for the other aims. For example, one method used
to generate predictions is the analysis of a variety of models with competing assumptions, called
robustness analysis. This is a common method in climate change modeling (Parker, 2011). But
none of those models are expected to accurately represent the causal influences on climate, nor to
explain climate change. The tool of robustness analysis helps achieve one aim, but there are many
other aims to which it does not contribute.
This division in the pursuit of different aims of science is due in part to the widespread use
of idealizations and the variety of purposes for which idealizations are used. Recall from above
that whether an idealization furthers understanding depends on the specific goals of the research.
This is why, e.g., Snell’s law is appropriate to apply to anisotropic media when researchers want
to understand optical refraction in general, but not when they want to understand the path of a
specific light ray. More broadly, whether an idealization furthers any given aim of science depends
on the specifics of that aim. Snell’s law may help us understand optical refraction, but it is too
idealized to give precise predictions of light’s path of travel in anisotropic media. For that we need
a different tool. This stands in contrast to the example just above of making climate predictions
with the use of several idealized models, models that do not help us understand climate change.
The idea that different aims of science must be pursued separately is evocative of Cartwright’s
(1983) study of how laws are either false and explanatory or else predictive (but not both).
Elsewhere I have also defended the view that the aims of explanation and prediction push in
different directions [cit. omitted]. The separate pursuit of scientific aims is also related to the view
that there are tradeoffs among the desirable features of models, such as their generality, precision,
and realism or accuracy (Levins, 1966; Odenbaugh, 2003; Matthewson and Weisberg, 2009). This is
the idea that increasing a model’s generality, for example, is achieved by decreasing its precision or
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accuracy. Different features of models, such as greater generality or greater precision, will differently
position those models to contribute to particular representational or predictive aims. In my view,
the nature of the selected tradeoff reflects the purpose to which a model or other scientific product
is put. Isaac (2013) similarly argues that models have specific functions, such as prediction and
use in policymaking, and that many of these functions are best satisfied by abandoning the goal of
realistic representation.
This conception of the aims of science in conflict requires one amendment. Recall from above
that idealizations can facilitate understanding of a phenomenon by demonstrating that some of
its features—including causally important features—are nonetheless unimportant to the current
research focus. Which features should be understood is, thus, relative to a specific research focus.
This means that an understanding of some features of a phenomenon may be purchased at the cost
of misunderstanding, i.e. misrepresenting, other features. So, for example, an evolutionary game
theory model may demonstrate the role of natural selection in producing cooperative behavior,
while occluding the role of non-selective and non-evolutionary influences. These might include,
for example, specific genetic influences and alternative, non-evolutionary influences like learning.
In the context of other research programs, such as those with a population genetic focus or an
epigenetic focus, understanding these other features of cooperative behavior will move to center
stage. This shows how the epistemic aim of understanding can, in itself, motivate different scientific
products that are appropriate for different research focuses. It seems the same is true for other
scientific aims. For example, the prediction of different features of a phenomenon often must be
accomplished by different means. Accordingly, not only do the aims of science conflict, but so too
do deployments of a single aim, including even the narrowly epistemic aim of understanding.
There are two main reasons for the tension among different aims of science and different
deployments of a single aim—reasons, also, for the variety of idealizations’ contributions to the aims
of science. These are the complexity of phenomena of scientific interest coupled with the limited
powers of human cognition and action. The complexity of phenomena investigated in science is by
now well appreciated; see, for instance, (Dupre´, 1993; Cartwright, 1999; Mitchell, 2003; Strevens,
2006; Wimsatt, 2007). All of the scientific aims discussed in this paper are valuable for their ability
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to further human comprehension and control of this complex world. Their furtherance is, thus,
relative to the limitations of human cognition and action.
Guiding policymaking and action are obvious examples, but prediction is similarly shaped by
human objectives. Faced with the complex phenomena that are the norm in scientific investigation,
scientists must choose which features of phenomena to focus on successfully predicting. Scientific
explanation is also influenced by human limitations. Explanation is in furtherance of human
comprehension, and its features are crucially shaped by this goal [cit. omitted]. Finally, if I
am right that the epistemic aim of science is understanding, then this too is in service to, and
shaped by, the particularities of human powers of comprehension. The limited powers of human
beings and especially of our cognition, when faced with incredibly complex phenomena, require the
focus on one particular scientific aim (at a time) to the exclusion of others. In order to successfully
predict, or to represent a certain element of the causal structure, or to provide quick guidance for
policy, one must sacrifice other aims.
It is enlightening to consider the nature of the position most directly opposed to my view of the
conflicting aims of science. The opposed position is that the same scientific products individually
further all aims of science—at least accurate representation, explanation, and prediction, and
possibly also including more human-centric aims like providing grounds for policymaking. If this
were the case, a single, best model would simultaneously offer the best causal representation, the
best explanation, and the best predictions. I suspect that this kind of view is motivated by an
implicit commitment to the idea that scientific products are true. If that were generally the case,
then one could expect individual scientific products to play all these roles. Representations that
are true in all important regards would provide a sufficient causal representation, be explanatorily
unimpeachable, and ground accurate predictions. But science does not aim for truth, or so I have
argued here. The aims of science are accordingly in tension.
This view of opposition among scientific aims also conflicts, though less directly, with views
that relate confirmation and prediction to explanation. One example of such a view is inference
to the best explanation; another is Douglas’s (2009a) argument that focusing on the aim of
prediction sheds light on approaches to explanation. As Cartwright (1983) has shown, predictive
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models often fail to be explanatory. Additionally, we hold on to explanations, like those provided
by evolutionary game theory models of cooperative traits, even when their predictions fail [cit.
omitted]. Moreover, we do not expect our explanations to be true, since as I discussed above, the
representations that provide them are not true. Emphasizing the separate pursuit of these different
scientific aims also undermines the appeal to multiple aims simultaneously—often prediction and
explanation—that commonly goes unnoticed in philosophy of science. Consider, as just one
example, that Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011) articulate their focus as the confirmation of
“empirical hypotheses that later figure in explanations of particular. . . phenomena” (p.758). They
see the confirmation of hypotheses—presumably by the accuracy of the predictions those hypotheses
ground—to be preparatory for explanatory work. In contrast, I suggest that these aims of science
are in fact opposed.
The conception of the relationship among scientific aims that I have developed here helps make
sense of a feature of science that would otherwise be puzzling. There is often a proliferation of
different approaches to studying the same phenomenon, approaches that apparently are in conflict
with one another. For instance, Longino (2013) surveys an astounding variety of approaches to the
study of human behavior, and in particular, human sexuality and aggression. She takes a pluralist
stance, according to which each approach provides knowledge, and in her view, this knowledge
is incommensurable across approaches. In Longino’s view, multiple, incommensurate items of
knowledge are possible because each approach differently defines the exact phenomenon under
investigation and differently parses the space of causal influences. The variety of scientific aims and
of specific deployments of individual aims makes sense of this practice. If accurate representation
of, e.g., the full suite of causes for human aggression were the uniform aim, then different research
results must be reconcilable (even if they could not be represented in a single model), or else one or
more of them must be wrong. But with different aims of representation, prediction, policy guidance,
etc., incommensurable findings that are in some sense about the same phenomenon may equally be
successful science. This also accounts for the persistence of deep disagreements about fundamental
principles within otherwise functional fields of research, e.g. as observed in population biology [cit.
omitted]. Each approach may be successful given its specific aims, and no approach succeeds in
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addressing all the relevant aims.
Faced with a variety of scientific aims and the possibility of multiple deployments of a single
aim, one might wonder what determines which aims are served by individual scientific projects. If
there are many different, potentially applicable scientific aims, by what standard do we judge the
success of individual scientific products? Some generalizations can be made about what determines
the applicable aims. First, as outlined above, the particular research focus directly influences
the features of a phenomenon that are central to understanding the phenomenon. The research
program also influences the broader determination of the importance of prediction, explanation,
action, etc. Second, a related influence is the features of the practitioners of science. We have seen
that the aims of science reflect the particularities of humans, especially our cognitive limitations.
The applicable aims are also influenced by the features of researchers themselves. Third, sometimes
features of the target audience are also relevant. One example of this influence is the significance of
whether the scientific product is intended for other researchers or policy-makers. When it comes to
determining the aim by which a particular scientific product should be judged, the applicable aim
can often be ascertained by charitable interpretation of the research conducted, including its setup,
the conclusions drawn, and its research and social contexts. There may nonetheless be ambiguity in
what aim is pursued and, thus, by what standard the work should be judged. Even more common is
a mismatch between the pursued aim and conclusions drawn from the research by other researchers
or, especially, by the popular media. Longino’s (2013) study of the sciences of human aggression
and sexuality nicely illustrates this as well.
3.3 Cautions for Reading Metaphysics Off Our Science
The rise of naturalistic philosophy, viz., philosophy that accords some or even total authority
to empirical sciences, has been accompanied by questions about the relationship between science
and metaphysics in particular. Attempts to naturalize metaphysics aim to demonstrate how our
best scientific findings should inform our metaphysical commitments. In contrast, I have already
defended two positions that drive a wedge between scientific practice and specific metaphysical
implications. In Chapter Two I argued both that science does not uncover laws of nature and that
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an account of how the concept of causation is employed in science does not give insight into the
metaphysics of causation. In Chapter Four I defend a similar conclusion for levels of organization.
Here I address directly the matter of the metaphysical significance of our best scientific findings.
A few examples of approaching metaphysics with an eye toward science are (Dupre´, 1993;
Ladyman and Ross, 2007) and essays collected in (Ross et al., 2013); I engage with these examples
below. These are but a few of many recent attempts to draw a variety of connections between science
and metaphysics, and much effort has gone into articulating and analyzing versions of naturalized
metaphysics. (Indeed, (Ross et al., 2013) is a nice survey of some of this work.) Let me be clear
at the outset of this discussion that I do not pretend to settle the issue of the proper relationship
between science and metaphysics here. My remarks may well not apply to some approaches to a
naturalized metaphysics, and they may be consistent with other approaches. I do, however, believe
that caution is in order when one examines science for metaphysical import, and that some attempts
to naturalize metaphysics have been insufficiently cautious. Several of the ideas I advocate in this
book can be used to motivate greater caution.
In this chapter I have defended the ideas that there is a variety of scientific aims, which are
best pursued separately, and that the epistemic aim of science is not truth but understanding.
Each of these views curtails science’s metaphysical import. First, if science is not in the business
of producing truths, then it is poorly positioned to uncover metaphysical truths, or even directly
inform them. Granted, as discussed above, some broad truths emerge on the basis of our best
science. However, such knowledge is not generally of the kind that supports metaphysical inferences.
The truths that science provides are particular, viz., limited in scope and about rather concrete
affairs, or they are partial, viz., have exceptions or elements of untruth. Nor is understanding,
the ultimate epistemic achievement of science, well suited to ground metaphysical conclusions.
Understanding is yoked to particularities of our epistemic position and human psychology, two
limitations that a successful metaphysics must escape. Second, that science has a variety of aims,
best pursued separately, is similarly problematic. This undermines the idea that scientific products
are converging—or will at some future point in time converge—and provide a unified account of
the world. A diverse array of tools for piecemeal prediction, explanation, policy guidance, etc., has
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little metaphysical import.
There is also a broader argument to be had against science’s direct metaphysical import. As
discussed in Chapter One, science is a human endeavor. It is a tool, or more accurately several
tools, designed by humans to further our cognitive ends and our ability to exert influence on our
world. If I am right that this indelibly shapes the character of science, then science is simply not
objective in the right way to play a metaphysical role. Surely any metaphysics aspires to escape
the particularities of human concerns and cognitive abilities. I address the topic of how human
features and values enter into science and the resulting limits of science’s objectivity more fully
in Chapter Six. All of this suggests that the process and products of science, including scientific
understanding, should not be used as a window into reality, at least not of the sort metaphysicians
seek.
This view will become clearer by examining particular ways in which science has been used
to motivate metaphysical conclusions. Dupre´ (1993) suggests that, even though metaphysical
presuppositions ground the enterprise of science, scientific findings can and should be used to
corroborate or undermine those assumptions. Metaphysical positions on the chopping block include
essentialism about natural kinds, reductionism regarding scientific theories as well as regarding
entities, and determinism. In this book I defend an account of science that is friendly, and in
certain regards even similar, to Dupre´’s view of science. But the implications I see for metaphysics
are different in kind. In the end, Dupre´ claims that his conception of scientific disunity implies
the failure of all the metaphysical theses at issue: determinism, essentialism about kinds, and
reductionism. In contrast, I think one can consistently recognize the features of science Dupre´
attends to and yet still embrace those metaphysical positions.
Consider, first, natural kinds. Attention to science might demonstrate that essentialism about
natural kinds is not reflected in scientific practice. And then, Dupre´ is free to find inspiration in
that for a radically altered conception of metaphysical kinds. But that thesis is not read off the
science, for science is not in the business of telling us such things. The case of reductionism is
more nuanced. In my view, Dupre´ is right that scientific practice undermines reductionism about
scientific theories (see Chapter Four), but this is a thesis about the enterprise of science itself.
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The metaphysical question of the reduction of entities that he also addresses, in contrast, is an
issue distinct from scientific practice. Here a position might be informed by our best scientific
findings, such as the failure of science to uncover reduction relationships among many entities (see
Potochnik, 2010). But one might instead reasonably maintain metaphysical reductionism regarding
entities. In that case, one might attribute the failure of science to hand us reduction relationships
to science’s many competing goals. Perhaps when reduction relationships are not uncovered, this
is because that is not the scientific aim, or at least not the most important aim. The state of our
science thus does not arbitrate for us the question of metaphysical reductionism.
Ladyman and Ross (2007) emphasize science’s ability to get at the “objective character of the
world.” Their criticism of classical metaphysics is, in part, based on the idea that when common
sense and science conflict, commonsense ideas must be jettisoned in favor of science. On their view,
fundamental physics is also privileged over all other fields of science. Ladyman and Ross endorse
an exceptionless principle to this effect; they say that a hypothesis simply conflicting with findings
in fundamental physics is sufficient reason to reject that hypothesis. As a result, they hold that
quantum physics has demonstrated that there are no things, only structures.
First let us consider whether scientific findings always warrant jettisoning commonsense ideas.
Science is refined everyday reasoning, but as demonstrated in this chapter, its refinement actually
ill-suits it for metaphysical work. To consider an example relevant to Ladyman and Ross’s project,
quantum physics is not reconciled with the theories of relativity, and I do not know of a reason to
expect it to be in the future. Each of these scientific achievements provides an understanding of a
certain domain—one domain certain phenomena at very large scales, the other certain phenomena
at infinitesimal scales.3 Multiplicity and disunity tend to persist among our scientific approaches
and findings. This was illustrated above with the examples of various approaches to studying human
aggression, as well as the variety of behavioral ecology approaches to accounting for cooperative
behavior. And if assumptions or direct claims that figure into different scientific achievements are
not reconcilable with one another, there are no grounds for concluding that those assumptions and
claims should be reconcilable with extra-scientific beliefs. Moreover, the ways in which science’s
3The idea that physics is fully general is inaccurate of the actual content of physics; theories and models there are
just as limited in scope and accuracy as elsewhere in science.
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practices and products are human-centric prevents them from being objective in the strong sense
needed to ground metaphysical conclusions.
Melnyk (2013) is critical of Ladyman and Ross’s idea that science provides access to objective
reality. Nonetheless, he agrees that when the results of scientific methods and everyday methods
conflict, we should always prefer the former (p.84). But this is also wrong. Science extends the
reach of human understanding considerably, but it cannot escape its basis in our experiences. Those
experiences must ultimately ground our concepts and our scientific understanding. Of course, this
is not to suggest that quantum mechanics should be rejected because it belies what common sense
would lead us to expect. But I do suggest that concluding on the basis of quantum physics that—at
any scale, on any construal—there are no objects is overly hasty. This is not an element of quantum
physics, but an extension of it to include the scale of middle-sized objects. It is familiarity with
those very objects, and the scientific and non-scientific generalizations that can be made about
them, that serve as our epistemic departure for all of science. Extending scientific results in certain
ways amounts to an overextension; I suggest this is one of those ways.
A brief departure from the main focus here will, I think, prove helpful. The relationship I
have motivated between science and commonsense reasoning is reminiscent of an idea central to
Otto Neurath’s conception of science and, in particular, the role of so-called protocol sentences.
In Neurath’s view, protocol sentences—the ultimate epistemic basis for all of science—are third-
person reports of everyday observations, using ordinary language. That language is ambiguous
and imprecise; Neurath called such terms Ballungen, which has been variously translated as
“congestions,” “conglomerations,” and “clusters.” The ambiguity and imprecision serves a purpose:
these stabilize language-use across individuals, cultures, and time-periods. In contrast, scientific
terms are precise, but they are also theory-driven. Neurath points out that “the terms of science
must adapt themselves much more to the new theories than a cluster” (Neurath, 1936), reprinted
in (Neurath, 1983, p.149). And so, according to Neurath,
Our whole life consists in two opposite movements: in the one we tend to acquire always
new concepts and to modify those that tradition has left us; but in the other we are
obliged to take the traditional statements as the basis for our departure (p.150).
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This is, akin to, and indeed related to, the epistemic relationship between common sense and
science. The tools of science have much extended the reach of human understanding, and they
have rightly led us to reject many commonsense beliefs that at one time appeared unassailable.
But certain commonsense beliefs get the whole endeavor up and running, and even the best results
of our scientific enterprise will always be more tentative.
I also take issue with a second position Ladyman and Ross employ to reach their metaphysical
conclusions. In my view, physics should not be accorded a special status relative to the other
sciences. This is a claim about the relationship among the fields of science, and so what we find
in science is properly used to decide the claim’s well-foundedness. But what science shows us
does not favor Ladyman and Ross’s conclusion. The epistemic position of our best fundamental
physics is similar to, or perhaps worse than, our best findings in other fields. There is no reason
to expect our investigations of microphysical phenomena to be epistemically privileged. Indeed,
those investigations face a number of epistemic difficulties that other fields do not, such as the
inaccessibility of direct observation and the tremendous amount of equipment generally required
for experimentation. So there is no reason for our best physical theories to override findings from
other fields.
Consider that William Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, and Darwin famously disagreed regarding
the age of the Earth. In the first edition of the Origin of Species (1859), Darwin estimated from
geological evidence that the Earth was of an age sufficient for gradual evolution by natural selection.
However, based on thermodynamics, Kelvin estimated that the Sun was 30 million years old. This
suggested that the Earth had actually not been habitable for a sufficient period of time for such
evolutionary change. Darwin was sufficiently convinced by this that he removed discussion of
timescales from the later editions of the Origin, but Kelvin was wrong, for he did not appreciate the
role of fusion in the Sun’s production of energy. The well-founded, carefully applied physics turned
out to be wrong, and the geology and speculative, new biology turned out to be right. Granted,
certain claims in physics are more epistemically secure than certain claims in other sciences. But
the reverse is also true. If physics is not more trustworthy than other fields of investigation,
then this undermines those projects, like Ladyman and Ross’s, that would base their metaphysical
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conclusions entirely on the products of fundamental physics. In biology, geology, and many other
properly scientific fields, references to particular objects abound.
At root, the position I advocate here is simply that extreme caution is warranted when
drawing metaphysical conclusions from the practices or products of science. One cannot in general
simply read metaphysical implications directly off scientific findings. This is due to the nature of
science—its human-centric design and its limited connection to truth. An extension of scientific
findings does not necessarily trump commonsense judgments. And, physics is not special among
the sciences. Notice that this does not bar every attempt at a naturalized metaphysics nor a
“scientific” metaphysics. That I advocate a wedge between scientific findings and metaphysical
implications does not mean that I think analytic metaphysics should ignore the scientific enterprise
and continue business as usual. One might very well go about constructing a metaphysics that
is consistent with and informed by our best science (as well as everyday reasoning), and the view
would almost certainly benefit from this connection. This would be analogous to the eventuation
of commonsense-style claims from scientific research that are straightforwardly true or false as I
outlined in the previous section. But any such metaphysics will not be read off our science, not
even our fundamental physics.
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